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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasingly active role that corporations assume in all as-
pects of modem life is accompanied by their correspondingly in-
creased participation in criminal activities. Although most of their
delinquent activity is confined to white-collar offenses, it also has
spread to other fields of criminality. To contend with this phenome-
non, the Anglo-American legal system has transformed the concept
of corporate criminal liability into a major legal tool.
The theory of corporate criminal liability has raised difficult is-
sues regarding various aspects of criminal law. These issues became
prominent a few years ago when a large automobile corporation was
tried for reckless homicide after being charged with recklessly fail-
ing to repair known lethal defects in the manufacture of cars which
caused the death of three persons.'
The trial and acquittal that followed provoked great public re-
action. This response, however, did not exhaust the analysis of the
criminal aspects involved in subjecting corporate bodies to criminal
liability. The press was directed mostly to the economic aspects of
the manufacturer's product liability,2 a subject also addressed by
I State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 80-5324 (Ind. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1980).
2 See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 1980, at 74; TIME, Mar. 24, 1980, at 24; U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1980, at 11; NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1980, at 65-66. See also the
editorials of The Miami Herald, Mar. 23, 1980; The Blade (Toledo), Mar. 19, 1980; Des
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civil law. Even legal scholars did not take much advantage of the
opportunity to make a new and thorough evaluation of the practical
and especially the normative questions involved in imposing crimi-
nal liability on corporations, particularly with regard to such a seri-
ous offense.3 Thus, significant problems concerning this subject
received inadequate consideration, including: analyzing which goals
of criminal law are achieved by indicting the corporate body; deter-
mining the practical and doctrinal significance of labeling the corpo-
rate entity a "killer"; and interpreting the meaning of merely
imposing a fine as a penalty for such a severe offense as man-
slaughter.
4
The purpose of this study is to re-examine the general range of
questions spawned by the doctrine which views the corporate entity
as an offender capable of violating the most severe prohibitions of
substantive criminal law. First, this Article will present a summary
of the main attitudes prevalent in the Anglo-American legal system
on this subject. It will then outline some of the theoretical and prac-
tical problems which follow from making the corporation an object
of criminal liability. Finally, this study will present basic guidelines
to an alternative solution to the problem of criminal conduct within
the framework of corporate entities. The proposed solution will fo-
cus on the direct responsibility of the perpetrators of the offenses
and on the liability of various levels of corporate management and
supervision involved. In addition, the proposed solution will sug-
gest supplementary measures for dealing with the corporate body
itself which do not entail conviction. This solution will conclude by
Moines Tribune, Mar. 19, 1980; The Salt Lake Tribune, Mar. 18, 1980; The Dispatch
(Columbus), Mar. 18, 1980; The Tennessean (Nashville), Mar. 17, 1980; Albuquerque
Journal, Mar. 17, 1980; Detroit Free Press, Mar. 15, 1980; Tulsa World, Mar. 15, 1980;
San Jose News, Mar. 14, 1980; The Oregonian (Portland), Mar. 14, 1980.
3 But see Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.: Constitutional, Utilitarian and Moral Per-
spectives, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 857 (1983); Radella, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide:
Has the Fiction Been Extended Too Far?, 4J.L. & COM. 95 (1984); Swigert & Farrell, Corporate
Homicide: Definitional Process in the Creation of Deviance, 15 L. & Soc. REv. 161 (1980); Com-
ment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L.
REV. 465 (1981); Comment, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-Making,
54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 911 (1979).
4 For some other recent cases concerning corporate criminal liability for homicide
offenses requiring mens rea, see Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court of Fresno
County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1984); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP
Gas Co., Inc., 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51
N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain
School Bus Lines Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980); Vaughan & Sons v. State,
649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). See also Anderson, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor
Specific Intent Crimes and Offenses of Criminal Negligence-The Direction of Texas Law, 15 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 231 (1984).
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considering the exceptional category of administrative strict liability
violations.
II. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN APPROACH
The theory that a corporation may be subject to criminal liabil-
ity has grown in stages, starting from the mid-19th century. There
are many parallels in the consolidation of this theory in the English
and American legal systems. In both systems, the penetration of
civil law doctrines into the criminal arena has contributed greatly to
the advancement of the principles of corporate criminal liability.5
One commentator has compared the development of the theory
of corporate criminal liability in the Anglo-American system to the
growth of weeds because "nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, no-
body planted it, it just grew." 6 Referring to the origin of the theory,
this pictorial statement is undoubtedly true. The evolutionary pro-
cess of the theory was not, however, altogether wild and accidental,
nor did it lack internal legal reasoning and legal direction. Three
major directions in the development of corporate criminal liability
are evident. The first involves the expansion of corporate criminal
liability from situations of nonfeasance to situations of positive ac-
tions;7 the second extends the scope of corporate liability from ar-
eas of strict liability to those requiring mens rea ;8 and the third
5 For some historical background of corporate criminal liability in the United States,
see Bernard, The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 3
(1984); Brickley, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 393 (1982); Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime, 14 COLUM. L. REV.
469 (1914); Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE LJ. 827 (1927); Elkins,
Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. LJ. 72 (1976); Comment,
Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1928).
For an introduction to English law on the subject, see L. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF CORPORATION IN ENGLISH LAW (1969); Burrows, The Responsibility of Corpora-
tions Under Criminal Law, 1 J. CRIM. SC. 1 (1948); Winn, The Criminal Responsibility of Corpo-
rations, 3 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 398 (1929); Comment, The Criminal Liability of Corporations, 62
L.Q. REV. 345 (1946).
6 Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PIT. L. REV. 21 (1957).
7 As to England, see The Queen v. The Birmingham and Glouster Ry. Co., [1842] 3
Q.B. 223, 231-34, 114 Eng. Rep. 492, 495-96. It was only later that corporations were
tried for misfeasance such as causing public nuisance. See The Queen v. The Great N. of
England Ry. Co., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298 (Q.B. 1846).
As to the United States, see State v. Great Work Milling & Manufacturing Co., 20
Me. 41, 43-44 (1841). Cf Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68
Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 345 (1854); State v. The Morris & Essex Railroad, 23 N.J.L. 360, 370
(1852).
8 In England, the possibility of imputing intent to a legal entity was mentioned in
Chuter v. Freeth and Pocock Co., [1911] 2 K.B. 832, 836; see also Mousell Bros. Ltd. v.
London and North-Western Ry. Co., [1917] 2 Q.B. 836, 846. In the United States, the
possibility of imposing criminal liability on a corporation for mens rea offences was re-
ferred to in United States v.John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1898). Since the
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expands the basis for establishing corporate criminal liability from
vicarious responsibility to direct liability.9 These developments
have undermined all the restrictions originally present in the theory
of corporate criminal liability. The theory has evolved into one with
almost no limitations, and corporate bodies are being charged and
convicted routinely for serious offenses against property and even
for offenses against the person.' 0
The imputation of criminal liability on the corporation has
reached its extreme in American case law. The mainstream of that
law transfers the doctrine of respondeat superior from the law of torts
to the realm of criminal law.11 The respondeat superior doctrine, which
governs inter alia civil corporate liability, is based on the theory of
vicarious responsibility which imputes the acts of the agent to the
principal. The Supreme Court asserts that establishing respondeat su-
perior as the base of corporate criminal liability amounts to carrying
the civil doctrine "only a step farther . . . in the interest of public
policy" to "control" the conduct of an agent by "imputing his act to
his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for
which he is acting."' 2 According to the respondeat superior doctrine,
the corporation is liable for the criminal act of its agent if the agent,
who is himself culpable, acted "within the scope of his employment
and with the intent to benefit the corporation."1 3
beginning of the present century, this has become common practice in the United States
courts. See, e.g., United States v. MacAndrews Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 835-36 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1906); United States v. Alaska Packers Ass'n and Babler, 1 Alaska 217, 220 (1901);
Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (1899).
9 The alter ego theory, which deals with the corporation's direct responsibility and
identifies, under certain conditions, the conduct of the corporation's managerial figures
with that of the corporate entity, was developed in England in Mousell Bros. Ltd., [1917] 2
K.B. at 846. The theory reached its maturity in the criminal law area in D.P.P. v. Kent
and Sussex Contractors Ltd., [1944] K.B. 146, 155-56; R. v. I.C.R. Haulage Ltd., [1944]
K.B. 551, 559; Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd., [1944] 2 All E.R. 515, 516-17.
In the United States this approach is only a minority view. See, e.g., People v. Cana-
dian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 149, 151, 161 N.E. 455, 456 (1928). Cf Common-
wealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 277-78, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972). See also infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
10 Mueller, supra note 6, at 22-23. (according to prevailing approach, there is no
logical reason why corporations should not bear responsibility-even for murder).
II See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir.
1962); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS c. 12 (5th ed. W. Keeton ed.
1984); Edgerton, supra note 5, at 835-36; Elkins, supra note 5, at 97; Fisse, Reconstructing
Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141,
1192-93 (1983); Mueller, supra note 6, at 39; Comment, Criminal Responsibility for Acts of
Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930).
12 New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494
(1909).
13 Id. at 494-95; see also United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88,
99 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
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Under this approach, the corporation can be held liable for the
conduct of any of its employees or agents, irrespective of the posi-
tions they hold.1 4 Yet, case law has expanded this doctrine even
further. It has been decided, for example, that a precise identifica-
tion of the agent is not a precondition to holding the corporation
liable as long as there is general proof that one of its agents commit-
ted the offense.' 5 Moreover, even when no individual agent has suf-
ficient knowledge to form the mens rea requirement of the offense,
courts have convicted the corporation by "piecing together" the
knowledge of several employees and ascribing their "collective
knowledge" to the entity.16 Courts also have found the corporate
body liable under the respondeat superior theory even though the cor-
poration's agents were acquitted 17 of the same offense.
Furthermore, courts have held that a corporation cannot de-
fend itself by claiming that the criminal conduct of a corporation's
employee or agent would not have benefitted the corporation.',
The argument often advanced for denying the corporation this de-
fense is that the theory focuses on the agent's motivation rather
than on the advantages of the agent's conduct to the corporation.19
The judiciary has interpreted the term "scope of employment"
to include those acts of employees which do not exceed the limits of
their position.20 Yet, the courts have held corporations liable for
acts of employees notwithstanding that the employee acted against
459 U.S. 991 (1982); Steere Tank Lines Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir.
1963); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 32 U.S. 788
(1943).
14 United States v. Hangar One Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977); Standard
Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
George F. Fish Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946).
'5 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941).
16 United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974). See
also infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
17 Magnolia Motor and Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950, 953 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233,
253 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aft'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 613 (1941).
18 United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915
(1963); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 959 (1949); Old Monastry v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945).
19 The Court should acquit the corporate entity only if the agent's action was in-
tended to advance any interest other than his corporate employer's. See Steere Tank
Lines Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1969); Standard Oil Co. of Texas
v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962). But cf Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd.,
[1944] 2 All E.R. 515, 516 (England); R. v. McNamara, (1981) 56 C.C.C. 2d 193, 315
(Canada).
20 See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F. 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960).
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corporate policy and was specifically instructed not to perform the
act in question. 21 Moreover, when an agent oversteps the limits of
the position, subsequent ratification of the act by an authorized
principal is sufficient to render the corporation liable for the crimi-
nal acts of its agent.
22
In comparison with American law, English law has adopted a
significantly narrower approach, imposing on corporations either vi-
carious or direct criminal liability. Each of these doctrines is applied
to different categories of offences. A corporation is vicariously lia-
ble, according to English law, for the acts of its agent only in situa-
tions in which individuals would be held similarly liable.23 The
limits, requirements and method of application of the doctrine of
vicarious liability apply equally whether the individual's or the cor-
poration's liability is of issue.24 Lord Atkin stated: "Once it is de-
cided that this is one of those cases where a principal may be held
criminally liable for the act of his servant, there is no difficulty in
holding that a corporation may be the principal." 25 In line with
American decisions, English courts also will find a corporation vicar-
iously liable for the acts of an agent if those acts are performed
within the scope of employment, although in opposition to the ex-
21 United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Co., 433
F.2d 147, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 489 (1971); United States v. Armor
& Co., 168 F.2d 342, 344 (3d Cir. 1948). Cf. Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158
F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946).
Some courts have indicated, however, that acts done contrary to express instruc-
tions or policies of the corporation may raise the question whether the employee in fact
acts to benefit the corporate body. See United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711
F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983); United States v. Beusch, 596
F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally Friedman, Some Reflections on the Corporation as
Criminal Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 173, 182 (1979); Miller & Levine, Recent Develop-
ments in Corporate Criminal Liability, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 41, 43-46 (1984).
22 See Continental Baking Co., 281 F.2d at 149-51.
23 See Newton Ltd. v. Smith, [1962] 2 Q.B. 278, 284-85; James & Son Ltd. v. Smee,
[1954] 3 All E.R. 273, 280; Quality Dairies (York) Ltd. v. Pedley, [1952] 1 K.B. 275, 278-
79; Griffiths v. Studebakers, Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 102, 106.
24 Similar to the prevailing legal approach in the United States, the English law re-
quires that the agent or employee must act within the course of his employment for the
doctrine of vicarious liability to apply. See Coppen v. Moore (No. 2), [1898] 2 Q.B. 306,
312. The technique often used by English courts in interpreting criminal provisions as
imposing vicarious liability in addition to direct liability was termed "extension of
verbs." It is based on constructing the verb used by the legislature to describe the for-
bidden conduct so that it refers to the person who performed it as well as to those in
whose service he acted. This technique was described as the formation of"a new judicial
dictionary." See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART 281 (2d ed. 1961).
25 Mousell Bros. Ltd., [1917] 2 K.B. at 846.
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press direction of superiors. 26
Vicarious responsibility, however, has limited scope in English
criminal law. It applies chiefly to the exceptional category of strict
liability offenses-offenses with questionable affiliation to criminal
law.27 To expand this restrictive application of the vicarious liability
doctrine, English law has adopted another doctrine from the law of
torts, the theory of the organs of the corporation (i.e., the alter ego
theory). 28 The theory of the organs of the corporation identifies the
acts and thoughts of prominent figures in the corporation's hierachy
(known as organs) when acting within the scope of their authority as
those of the corporate entity itself. By assigning the organ's mens rea
to the corporation, this technique serves as a device for the personi-
fication of the corporate body, thus enabling the conviction of the
corporation as directly liable for offenses which require criminal in-
tent.29 This process of identification is so deeply rooted that Lord
Reid has commented that it is misleading to refer to a person acting
on behalf of the corporation as its alter ego: "The person who speaks
and acts as the company is not alter. He is identified with the
company."3°
The proponents of the theory of the organs of the corporation
have had to grapple with the problem of defining the organs by for-
mulating a criterion to distinguish them from other employees of
the corporation. No clear test has evolved, however, and many diffi-
culties have been encountered in the attempt to apply the theory.3'
Nevertheless, the theory is utilized in most of the legal systems influ-
enced by English law, including New Zealand, 3
2 Canada,3 3 India34
26 See Griffiths v. Studebakers, Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 102, 105; James & Son Ltd. v.
Smee, [1954] 3 All E.R. 273, 280.
27 See generally L. LEIGH, STRICT AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CRIMINAL LAW (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 191-206.
28 Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1915] A.C. 705, 713;
H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. TJ. Graham & Sons Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 159, 172.
29 For early signs of deviation from the vicarious liability mode while considering
corporate criminal liability, see Mousell Bros. Ltd., [1917] 2 K.B. at 846. However, the
significant application of the theory of the organs of the corporation in the criminal area
began in England in 1944, probably as a result of pressures imposed by the economy of
war. See Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd., [1944] K.B. at 155-56; L C.R. Haulage Ltd., [1944]
K.B. at 559; L Bresler Ltd., [ 1944] 2 All E.R. at 516-17. For an adoption of the theory of
the organs of the corporation by the House of Lords, see Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v.
Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153, 170-01, 180-01, 187-88, 190-01, 200-01. See also R.v. An-
drews-Weatherfoil Ltd., [1972] 1 W.L.R. 118, 123-24.
30 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd., [1972] A.C. at 171.
31 See, e.g., L. LEIGH, supra note 5; Heerey, Corporate Criminal Liability-A Reappraisal, 1
U. TAS. L. REV. 677 (1962).
32 See Nordik Industries Ltd. v. Regional Controller of Inland Revenue, [1976] 1
N.Z.L.R. 194; Morris v. Wellington City, [1969] N.Z.L.R. 1038; Muir, Tesco Supermar-
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and Israel.3 5 Australian law is less clear,36 whereas the South African
system appears to adopt principles more similar to those of the re-
spondeat superior doctrine.3 7 A similar school of thought exists in the
United States as a minority view and imputes the criminal intent
only of the corporation's managerial hierarchy to the corporate en-
tity.3 8 Some major guidelines of this approach have been adopted
by the Model Penal Code3 9 and several states.
40
III. DEFICIENCIES OF IMPOSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON
CORPORATE BODIES
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Subjecting non-corporal legal entities to criminal liability is a
broad theory that is usually a starting point for deliberation rather
than its outcome. Even the English Law Commission that stated
decisively that the courts "have made little attempt to define the na-
ture and purpose of the [criminal] liability [of corporations] which
they established" 4 1 did not thoroughly evaluate those matters. The
kets, Corporate Liability and Fault, 5 N.Z.U.L. REV. 357 (1973); Comment, Indication as to the
Real Nature of the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 6 Vic. U. WELL. 85 (1972).
33 See R. v. McNamara, (1981) 56 C.C.C.2d 193; R. v. St. Lawrence Corp. Ltd., [1969]
5 D.L.R. 3d, 263; R. v. Fane Robinson Ltd., (1941) 76 C.C.C. 196; LAW REFORM COM-
MISSION OF CANADA, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GROUP ACTION, PART II (Working
Paper No. 16, 1976); Caroline, Corporate Liability and the Courts: Where Are They Going?, 27
CRIM. L.Q. 237 (1985); Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups, 9
O-rAwA L. REV. 247 (1977); Yarosky, The Criminal Liability of Corporations, 10 McGILL L.J.
142 (1964).
34 See State of Maharashtra v. Messrs. Syndicate Transport Co. Ltd., [1964] A.I.R.
Born. 195; 1 H.S. GOUR, PENAL LAW OF INDIA 52 (9th ed. 1972).
35 See C.A. 109/1972 State of Israel v. Shefa-On Ltd. & Paz, 28(1) P.D. (Isr. L. Rep.)
(Hebrew).
36 See Morgan v. Babcock & Wilcox Ltd., (1929) 43 C.L.R. 163. But see Universal
Telecasters (Qid) Ltd. v. Guthrie, 18 AUSTL. L.R. 531 (1978) (adopting the English alter
ego theory); Fisse, The Distinction Between Primary and Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liability,
41 AUSTL. LJ. 203 (1967).
37 See 1 E.M. BURCHELL & P.M.A. HUNT, SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE 336 (1970); Barlow, The Criminal Liability of a Company, Its Directors and Its Servants,
63 S.A.LJ. 502 (1946).
38 See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 8 (6th Cir. 1946); State
v. Adjustment Department Credit Bureau Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 691 (Idaho 1971); People
v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 149, 151, 161 N.E. 455, 456 (1928). But cf.
Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972).
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962).
40 See, for example, the table comparing the Penal Codes of the States of New York,
Illinois, Michigan, Delaware, Pennsylvania and California, prepared by the NAT'L
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAXVs, I WORKING PAPERS 214-15 (1970). See
also TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22.
41 ENGLISH LAw COMMISSION, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAw, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES, CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS 10 (Published Working Paper No. 44, 1972).
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theoretical basis for imposing criminal liability on the corporation
remains unclear. The rationale occasionally suggested for imposing
this type of liability emphasizes the corporation's moral responsibil-
ity for what goes on within it,42 and presents pragmatic arguments
concerning its effectiveness,43 often without examining whether the
deterrent goal can be achieved in alternative ways. It is no wonder
that this subject is considered "the less familiar and more esoteric
area of the law of criminal liability."
44
Perhaps this uncertainty has encouraged the trend toward a
slight restriction in the scope of corporate criminal liability. In the
United States, the Model Penal Code and some state statutes have
suggested, with regard to mens rea offenses of affirmative conduct,
that unless "legislative purpose to impose liability on corporation
plainly appears," the corporate entity is criminally liable only for
offenses which were "authorized, requested, commanded, per-
formed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent, acting on behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment.
'45
A similar trend of limitation can be observed in England as well.
In the 1940's, the group of organs was held to include all "responsi-
ble agents" 46 and "important officials," 47 but in the 1970's the
House of Lords narrowed the group to include only those who
"constitute the directing mind and will of the company, '48 thus
somewhat restricting corporate criminal liability. These restrictions,
however, do not offer a solution to either doctrinal or practical
problems that underlie corporate criminal liability.
B. DOCTRINAL-CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES
1. Prescription and Human Consciousness
Penal law, being a prescriptive branch of law, purports to direct
the behavior of individuals in accordance with society's interests and
values. 49 A prerequisite for the achievement of this goal is transmit-
42 See, e.g., Edgerton, supra note 5, at 840-44.
43 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) § 2.07 comment at 148;
Anderson, supra note 4, at 250-52; Elkins, supra note 5, at 125-29; Fisse, supra note 11, at
1145-54; Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and
Prospects, 73 GEo. L.J. 1, 62 (1984); Comment, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Be-
havior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1231-41 (1979).
44 Allen, 33rd Annual Meeting, 1956 A.L.I. PROC. 171.
45 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962). See supra notes 38, 40.
46 Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd., [1944] K.B. at 156.
47 L Bresler Ltd., [1944] 2 All E.R. at 516.
48 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd., [1972] A.C. at 180, 187.
49 See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); H.M. Hart, The
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ting the criminal law dictates to an addressee capable of grasping
the message, namely the human consciousness. Indeed, the direct
and sharp connection with human consciousness is apparent in all
major aspects of criminal law: behavior, defenses and punishment.
Offenses deal with the individual's conscious deviation from permit-
ted modes of behavior. Defenses are offered to those who act under
lack of or diminished or disturbed consciousness. Similarly, the jus-
tification for punishing violators rests mainly on the assumption that
it will deter future conscious violations by the transgressor and
others. Hale, the renowned English jurist, described the insepara-
ble connection between criminal liability and human consciousness
almost 250 years ago:
Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, understand-
ing and liberty of will, and, therefore, is a subject properly capable of a
law properly so called, and consequently obnoxious to guilt and pun-
ishment for the violation of that law, which in respect of these two
great faculties he hath capacity to obey.50
This cohesive link within criminal law, between the commanding au-
thority and the conscious individual who alone is susceptive to gui-
dance, is threatened when confronted with the imputation of
criminal liability to corporations, which by their very nature lack any
consciousness.
Indeed, the very substance of the corporate body is controver-
sial and various views concerning it have emerged. There are those
who treat the corporate body as a mere legal fiction devoid of the
ability to function independently and requiring permanent repre-
sentation by human beings (the fictitious approach). Others treat
corporations as real entities claiming that the law merely recognizes
the existence of corporate bodies rather than creates the corporate
entities (the realist approach). A third group ofjurists rejects both
these approaches and offers additional explanations. 5'
Even the staunchest proponents of the realist approach, how-
ever, would concede that from a physical standpoint, distinctions
must be made between human beings and corporate bodies. Even
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401 (1958); Morris, The Proper Role of
Criminal Law, in READINGS ON CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 260 (R.W. Ferguson ed.
1975); Williams, The Proper Scope and Function of the Criminal Law, 74 L.Q. REV. 76 (1958).
50 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14 (Emlyn ed. 1736)
(London, Professional Book Ltd., 1971).
51 Seegenerally W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 656-59 (5th ed. 1967); G. KEETON, THE
ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 167-68 (2d ed. 1949); G. PATON, A TEXT-
BOOK OFJURISPRUDENCE 407-32 (4th ed. G. Paton & D. Derham eds. 1972); 4 R. POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE 200-61 (1959); Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personal-




assuming that the individual desires of a group of people working in
concert can form a "collective will" as a result of the interdepen-
dence and mutual influence within the group, and even assuming
that this synthesis of desires is distinct from the separate wills form-
ing it (because the mutual interest supposedly created is not neces-
sarily identical to the individual interests from which it has
originated),52 the problem of personifying the corporate body is not
thereby brought to a clear-cut solution. 53 The corporate entity is an
enterprise devoid of the physical ability characteristics of the human
race. Man possesses both consciousness and physical aptitude, as
well as the power to exercise them. Corporate bodies, in contrast,
are bereft of those capacities and depend totally on a human source
in order to function. 54 The theory which views the corporation as
subject to criminal liability challenges, therefore, the ideological and
normative basis of criminal law and its mode of expression and
operation.
2. The Perpetrator-Corporation Relationship
a. Defining the Problem
The theory of the organs of the corporation describes the per-
petrator-corporation relationship using the term "identification" 55
while the theory of respondeat superior speaks of "imputation.
' 56
These terms suggest that the organ's or the agent's conduct per-
formed within his scope of authority is the conduct of the corporate
entity and it may serve, therefore, as a base for imposing criminal
liability on the corporation. The term "identification" more clearly
illustrates this approach. In English law, the use of this term often
crystalizes the distinction between vicarious and direct corporate lia-
52 Fisse, supra note 11, 1190-92 n.235.
53 The reasoning behind the proposition that a separate "collective will" emerges
from the incorporation of a number of individuals is even more doubtful in the case of a
closely held corporation established by a sole promoter. See Woods, Lifting the Corporate
Veil in Canada, 35 CAN. B. REV. 1176, 1177 (1957) (when corporation is controlled by
single person "the distinct social reality of a corporate personality may be non-
existent").
54 Many commentators emphasize that "mind" has no meaning when applied to a
corporate body and that it lacks the prerequisites for moral culpability. See, e.g., Com-
ment, supra note 43, at 1241; Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
6-7 (1928); Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 582, 584 (1982).
55 L. LEIGH, supra note 5, ch. 7; Fisse, Consumer Protection and Corporate Criminal Respon-
sibility, 4 ADEL. L. REV. 113 (1971); Fisse, Responsibility, Prevention and Corporate Crime, 5
N.Z.U.L.R. 250, 254-65 (1973).
56 See Elkins, supra note 5, at 100-15; Comment, supra note 43, at 1247-48.
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bility,5 7 the scopes of which are completely different in that legal
system.58 The difference between imputation and identification
seems to lose its significance, however, in the analysis of the legal-
theoretical relationship between the perpetrator and the corporate
entity. American law regards imputation as a form of both personi-
fication and identification and employs the term to explain that the
conduct and especially the mens rea of the agent are the criminal act
and intent of the corporation as well.59 The case law has reached
the same result in England60 and Canada.61 When the agent and
the principal are two legally competent individuals, imputation (usu-
ally limited to impose vicarious liability for minor strict liability of-
fenses)62 serves solely as a transferring device through which the
principal is regarded as the one who has committed the offense.
When the principal is a corporate body, devoid of any human char-
acteristics, imputation also serves as a personification device which
enables the transformation of the human characteristics to the cor-
poration in order to consider it the performer of the offense.
In the area of substantive criminal law (as opposed to the realm
of strict liability administrative offenses) neither imputation nor
identification is supportable. Penal law, which emphasizes the per-
sonal aspect of liability, is hesitant to regard the illegal conduct of
one person as the conduct of another.
Therefore, attributing the conduct of an organ or an agent to
the corporation for the purpose of imposing liability on both brings
into existence a doctrinal limitation. Where a specific statutory pro-
vision prescribes such identification, as in several jurisdictions in the
57 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd., [1972] A.C. at 170; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note
41, at 2-3; R. CROSS & P. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAw 122-26, 464 (10th ed.
R. Card ed. 1984); Fisse, supra note 36.
58 See supra text accompanying notes 22-30.
59 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,492-93
(1909); Elkins, supra note 5, at 100-15; Metzger, supra note 43, at 49; Comment, supra
note 43, at 1247-48.
60 Kent and Sussex Contractors, [1944] K.B. at 156.
61 R. v. Electrical Contractors Association of Ontario and Dent, (1961) 27 D.L.R. 2d
193, 200.
62 Courts rarely impose vicarious liability for mens rea offenses. In English law, such
an imposition is restricted mainly to a licensee who delegates his responsibility as licen-
see to an agent and the latter breaches one of the delegated responsibilities (the delega-
tion principle). See Howker v. Robinson, [1973] QB. 178; R. v. Winson, [1969] 1 Q.B.
371; Vane v. Yiannopoulus, [1965] A.C. 486; Allen v. Whitehead, [1930] 1 K.B. 211.
Commentators have preferred, however, to regard the liability imposed in such circum-
stances as direct rather than vicarious. See Fisse, The Delegation Principle: Vicarious Liability
in Regulatory Offences, 10 CRIM. L.Q. 417 (1967); Fisse, The Elimination of I'icarious Responsi-
bility in Regulatory Offenses, 42 AusL. L.J. 199, 250 (1968); Fisse, Vicarious Liability in Regu-
latory Offenses, 44 AusTL. L.J. 147 (1970).
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United States, 63 the status of the relationship is delineated from the
outset. Creating a normative basis for this relationship, however,
does not reconcile the doctrinal and conceptual aspects of the legal
problem itself. Efforts have been made, therefore, to draw analo-
gies to the perpetrator-corporation relationship from other contexts
in which liability for substantial criminal offenses is imposed on two
separate personalities following the commission of a single offense,
as in the cases of conspiracy and complicity. While supporters have
argued that the perpetrator-corporation relationship can be defined
in terms of the above mentioned relationships, it is very doubtful
whether this approach presents a convincing solution to the issue.64
b. The Conspiratorial Relationship
One attempt to comprehend the attribution of the perpetrator's
offense to the corporation suggests comparing their relationship to
that of conspirators. The theory of conspiracy holds any conspira-
tor liable for crimes committed by fellow conspirators in the further-
ance of the conspiracy, 65 even if the conspirator was not capable of
committing the offense himself.66 The analogy to the theory of cor-
porate criminal liability suggests that each breach of law the corpo-
rate body has been accused of is in furtherance of an offense
previously plotted between the corporation and the perpetrator.
Hence, the corporation is criminally liable for the acts of the perpe-
trator in execution of the plan of the conspiracy.
The underlying assumption that a corporation and a perpetra-
tor can be partners to a criminal conspiracy is questionable. The
difficulties in applying the rules of conspiracy to the corporation-
perpetrator relationship are inherent in the differences between the
prospective natures of the relationships being compared. Conspir-
acy requires an agreement between separate parties to perform an
illegal act for which each party must have the necessary criminal in-
tent.67 The question is, therefore, whether the perpetrator and the
63 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 5-4 (a) (Smith-Hurd 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 20.20(2) (McKinney 1980); TEXAS PENAL CODE § 7.22(b) (Vernon 1974).
64 See infra text accompanying notes 65-87.
65 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
66 See State v. Myers, 211 P. 440 (Idaho 1922); State v. Martin, 199 Iowa 643, 200
N.W. 213 (1924).
67 See ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON CONSPIRACY AND CRIMINAL LAw RE-
FORM 12 (1976); ENGLISH LAw COMMISSION, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAw GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES, INCHOATE OFFENSES, CONSPIRACY, ATTEMPT AND INCITEMENT 19
(Working Paper No. 50, 1973); Marcus; Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theoly and in




corporation, which are actually one, can be separate parties to a
conspiracy.
Few courts have answered this question affirmatively. A Cana-
dian court found that a corporation can be convicted of conspiring
with its director when the director acts in distinctly different func-
tions. The court stated that:
it is not necessarily a defence to an indictment against a corpora-
tion. . .(for conspiracy) . . .that only one human being intended to
break the law. That person might act in more than one legal capacity.
For instance, he might be a director of more than one corporation, or
he might have personal interests of the same kind as that of a corpora-
tion of which he is a director. Thus, he may be regarded as though he
were two separate persons and two separate minds.
68
A United States federal court followed this line of reasoning with
regard to conspiracy, and stated: "[E]mployment alone by a corpo-
ration does not so merge the employee's mind and being with that
of the corporation so that one person's cognition remains rather
than more than one. .. .
This, however, does not seem to be the prevailing view. Many
jurists agree that a corporation cannot be convicted for conspiracy
with its organ or agent, nor can it be convicted for conspiracy with
another corporation through a common agent. 70 The rationale be-
hind this approach is that despite the legal perception that the per-
petrator and the corporation are separate legal personalities, the
corporation is incapable of either thinking or acting independently;
whereas the requirement for plurality of offenders in conspiracy is
fulfilled only where at least two minds meet, each of which is capable
of contributing to the furtherance of the conspiracy. This theory
has been adopted in England7 and Canada,72 and finds substantial
68 R. v. Electrical Contractors Ass'n of Ontario and Dent, (1961) 27 D.L.R. 2d 193,
200.
69 United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
70 ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION (REPORT), supra note 67, at 12-13; ENGLISH LAw CoM-
MISSION (Working Paper), supra note 67, at 21; Calvert, The Case of the Schizophrenic Man-
aging Director, 27 MOD. L. REv. 220 (1964); Goode, Corporate Conspiracy: Problems of Mens
Rea and the Parties to the Agreement, 2 DALHOUSIE LJ. 121, 138-41 (1975); Hall, The Substan-
tive Law of Crime 1887-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 616, 648 (1937); Welling, Intracorporate
Plurality in the Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 1155, 1184-1221 (1982); Com-
ment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Intracorporate Conspiracy, 72 Ky. LJ. 225, 231-38
(1984); Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 951-52
(1959).
71 R. v. McDonnell, [1965] 3 W.L.R. 1138, 1148. See also ENGLISH LAw COMMISSION
(REPORT), supra note 67; ENGLISH LAw COMMISSION (Working Paper), supra note 67; Cal-
vert, supra note 70.
72 R. v. Martin, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 434, 440. See also Caroline, supra note 33, at 252;
Goode, supra note 70.
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support in the United States. 73
Conspiracy is an independent offense and does not depend
upon the actual execution of what was agreed upon. It is con-
demned, however, primarily because the conspiracy might have re-
sulted in such criminal performance. Although even latent thoughts
of legal infractions are potentially dangerous, penal law interferes
only when an overt act is performed because only then does the
danger to society become tangible. In the context of conspiracy, an
overt agreement to perform an illegal act has a more obligatory ef-
fect on its parties and makes retreat from the idea more difficult.
Viewed in this way, the suggested comparison between conspirators
and perpetrator and corporation seems implausible. Even if the
perpetrator represents the corporation as well as himself in his
thoughts, these thoughts are anchored in a single human conscious-
ness. There need not have been any expression of the plan at its
formation, and if the perpetrator withdraws afterwards from the
idea of committing the offense, the plan will cease to exist. There-
fore, the practical implication of treating the perpetrator-corpora-
tion relationship as a conspiracy amounts to punishing thoughts, a
notion that stands in contradiction to fundamental principles of
criminal law and poses impossible problems of proof.
Moreover, conceptualizing the perpetrator-corporation as a
conspiratorial relationship based upon the distinct functions alleg-
edly performed by the single human mind during the perpetrator-
corporation relationship might have far-reaching consequences.
Such a line of argument might justify imposing criminal liability for
conspiracy by developing a theory of "legal schizophrenia" whereby
a human mind fulfilling diverse functions is viewed as a split mecha-
nism. For example, a trustee, a custodian, a bailee, or an agent
might be convicted for conspiracy for making a decision to breach
their duty of trust, although the person never acted upon this
decision.74
When the organ involved in the criminal activity consists of a
group of people (for example, directors of a corporation) with
whom the corporate body is identified with by the doctrines of iden-
tification or imputation, the situation is not fundamentally different.
A federal court's decision holding a corporation liable for conspir-
acy with two of its own agents, who had conspired between them-
73 Union Pacific Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909); United States
v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Santa Rita Store Co.,
16 N.M. 3, 113 P. 620 (1911). See also Hall, supra note 70; Welling, supra note 70; Com-
ment, supra note 70.
74 Calvert, supra note 70, at 222.
300 [Vol. 76
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
selves, 75 therefore, raised severe doctrinal difficulties about how the
conspiracy was established. 76 Even assuming that the cooperation
of the group produces a new entity, as proposed by the realist ap-
proach, a new separate consciousness or independent thinking
center does not evolve. The plurality of agents involved in an
agreement to commit an offense would justify conviction for con-
spiracy among themselves. 77 The corporate entity might serve as a
convenient instrument for carrying out the criminal plan, or it might
open new horizons for the perpetrators of the crime, but this does
not change the substance of the issue,78 nor does it render the cor-
poration a conspirator.
It is difficult, therefore, to explain the relationship between the
perpetrator and the corporation (and the resulting expansion of
criminal law) on the basis of the conspiracy theory. By definition,
the doctrines of identification and imputation are incompatible with
the conspiracy relationship. The distinctive feature of these doc-
trines is that they lift the legal veil which separates the perpetrator
from the corporation, and they view both the corporal and the legal
entities as one. The criminal conspiracy, on the other hand, focuses
on the coordination between two totally separate and independent
parties.
Thus, the theory of conspiracy is incompatible with the perpe-
trator-corporation relationship. Any interference with the mental
independence of the individual conspirators or any increase in their
mutual dependence gives rise to doubts as to their ability to con-
spire among themselves. For example, the common law questions
the ability of one to conspire with a minor or someone who is inca-
pable of forming the criminal intent required for conspiracy. 79 Even
the capacity of spouses to conspire with each other has been
75 United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970-72 (11th Cir. 1982); see also United
States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D. Ohio 1976). For a similar
basic opinion expressed in English law, see De Jetley, Marks v. Greenwood (Lord),
[1936] 1 All E.R. 863, 872-73; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 861.
76 The court avoided such an analysis and found that the "conceptual difficulty" was
"easily overcome" by policy considerations. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 970. For a criticism of
the decision, see Comment, supra note 70, at 234-38.
77 The director's argument in People v. Duke, 19 Misc. 292, 44 N.Y.S. 336, 337-38
(1897), that they can be considered as "fingers of one band" and should, therefore, be
acquitted of conspiracy among themselves, was promptly rejected by the court. See also
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943); State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 158 A. 797, 800 (1932); Welling, supra
note 70, at 1196-99; Comment, supra note 70, at 233-37.
78 Note, supra note 70, at 953.
79 ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION (REPORT), supra note 67, at 21-23; ENGLISH LAW COM-
MISSION (Working Paper), supra note 67, at 23.
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doubted. 80 If uncertainty as to the independence of one party to an
alleged conspiracy can call into question his capacity to conspire
with the party upon whom he is dependent, similar doubt must exist
when the mind of the alleged party to the conspiracy is in effect the
mind of the other party as well.
c. The Complicity Relationship
Another approach is to define the perpetrator-corporation rela-
tionship in terms of criminal complicity. Some support for this idea
can be found in legal literature 81 and case law. 82 This approach
raises difficulties as well because some of the features of the partici-
pants' relationship contradict those of the identification or imputa-
tion doctrines upon which the perpetrator-corporation relationship
is based.
Criminal complicity concerns the performance of a single of-
fense by a number of participants, each of whom takes a distinct part
in its performance. Only the behavior of the principal offender
must include all the elements of the offense. The accomplices fulfill
diverse functions and their respective contribution to the crime is
individually defined. 83 The counsellor or procurer is absent from
the scene of the crime even though he usually is the originator of
the offense, an advisor prior to its commission, and the motivating
force behind the commission of the crime. The aider-and-abettor,
on the other hand, is actually or constructively present at the scene
of the crime and assists the principal offender in its commission.
The actus reus for accomplice liability consists of persuading, insti-
gating or encouraging the principal offender to commit the offense
(referring to the counsellor or procurer) or assisting him in any way
in its commission including by words, gestures and even mute pres-
ence (referring to the aider-and-abettor).84 The mens rea for accom-
80 United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960); cf. Mawji v. R., [1957] 2 W.L.R. 277; R.
v. Whitehouse, (1852) 6 Cox C.C. 38; see also ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION (REPORT), supra
note 67, at 20-21; Williams, Legal Unity of Husband & 'ife, 10 MOD. L. REv. 16 (1947).
81 See, e.g., P. GILLIES, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 149-51 (1980); G. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 24, at 865-66; Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 24-28 (1928).
82 See, e.g., R. v. Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd., (1922) 2 K.B. 530, 542; R. v. Fell,
(1981) 64 C.C.C. 2d 456, 462; Lewis v. Crafter, Cavendish Laboratories Ltd. v. Crafter,
[1942] S.A.S.R. 30, 33.
83 See generally P. GILLIES, supra note 81; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK OF CRIM-
INAL LAW 495-521 (1972); G. WILLIAMS supra note 24, at 346-422; Perkins, Parties to
Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1941); Smith, Aid, Abet, Councel or Prouve, in RESHAPING
CRIMINAL LAW 120 (P.R. Glazebrok ed. 1978).




plice liability consists of two types: (1) the state of mind rendering
encouragement or assistance, which is confined to the accomplice's
intention to persuade, instigate, encourage (in case of a counsellor
or procurer) or assist (in case of an aider-and-abettor) the principal
offender in committing the offense, or at least the accomplice's
awareness of the possible results of his conduct; and (2) the state of
mind required for the offense committed, which, according to one
approach, consists of the appropriate kind and degree of mental ele-
ment vital to the crystalization of the subject offense, or, according
to another view, consists of the mere awareness of the possible oc-
currence of the offense.85
Analyzing the perpetrator-corporation relationship in terms of
criminal complicity raises similar problems to those encountered
when considering the comparison to conspiracy. The lack of the
necessary plurality of offenders, each of whom has independent
physical and mental capacities, is fatal to both comparisons. The
human consciousness operative in events involving the corporation
and the perpetrator is one-dimensional in the sense that it can be
only the persuasive force or, alternatively, the persuaded agent-it
cannot be both. A functional analysis suggesting that the same in-
telligence can be construed as performing a double role, at once
instigation and being instigated to commit the offense, is completely
artificial. The arguments which counteract a similar attempt to com-
pare the corporation-perpetrator relationship to conspiracy are also
effective here. Though a similar process of first weighing and then
determining whether to commit an offense usually occurs in the
mind of every criminal, an individual offender cannot be both an
inciter and a performer. The logical conclusion of such a line of
reasoning could again lead to the penalizing of thoughts.
The same conclusion results when comparing the perpetrator-
corporation relationship to that of the aider-and-abettor and the
principal. One physical and mental organism cannot at the same
time perform a forbidden act and assist in its performance. One
organism cannot intend to execute the crime totally alone and si-
multaneously intend to support another in doing the same act. By
definition, the actus reus of the aider-and-abettor is not the perform-
ance of the intended offense, but rather, the act of helping another
to commit it. Similarly, no form of legal acrobatics can interpret the
mens rea of a single mental state in ways that differ substantively.
The single mental state of the perpetrator corporation cannot be
85 P. GILLIES, supra note 81, at 56-89; W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 83, at 502-
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interpreted with respect to the corporation as the intention to per-
form the offense single-handedly, and, at the same time, with re-
spect to the perpetrator, now in the guise of the aider-and-abettor,
as the intent to aid another in committing the offense. An American
court rejected this possibility and declared unhesitatingly that: "if a
corporation can act only through its agent, and thereby become in
law completely identified with its agent, how can it be an accessory
to this act? For in such a case, it must be accessory to its own act,
which is a legal absurdity."8 6
Nonetheless, a functional examination of the above perpetra-
tor-corporation relationship can sometimes be significant, for exam-
ple, when a manager breaches a law applicable by definition only to
the corporate owner or to the corporate licensee of a business.
Such a situation illustrates a difficulty in arguing that the same party
both committed the forbidden act and assisted in its commission, or
that he intended to perform it singly and at the same time to carry it
out through another. From a functional point of view, the counsel-
ling or procuring in such an event perhaps can be distinguished
from the performance. The manager's actions lack the elements
required of the principal offender of the crime. The manager is not
the persona to whom the provision in question applies; therefore, he
can neither violate the specific provision nor possess the necessary
mental element to do so. Yet, when he operates as an organ or an
agent-namely, as the corporation itself, in accordance with the
identification doctrine-the manager's conduct might be viewed as
that of the principal.
Even under these circumstances, however, the lack of the neces-
sary characteristic of plurality of offenders in the perpetrator-corpo-
ration relationship makes it difficult to consider the relationship in
terms of the criminal participant theory. Each party within the crim-
inal partnership must be capable of individually fulfilling at least one
role in the partnership, otherwise he cannot be defined as a party.
In order to view the perpetrator as an aider-and-abettor to the cor-
poration, it would be necessary to prove that the body corporate
could independently fulfill the function of one of the parties to the
crime. Clearly, the corporate entity cannot satisfy such a condition.
An apparent resemblance seems to exist between the perpetra-
tor-corporation relationship during the commission of the crime
and the relationship of two offenders acting concurrently as joint
principals with the same intent to perform the offense. A closer
analysis will disclose, however, that the disparities override the ap-
86 State v. Southern Ry. Co., 145 N.C. 495, 542, 59 S.E. 570, 586 (1907).
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parent similarities. Joint principal offenders of an offense affect
their common purpose through mutual understanding and coordi-
nation. Therefore, the actual criminal outcome of their activity may
be viewed as a single unit. Yet, the physical and mental elements of
the offense exist independently in each offender and are individually
manifest in obvious and concrete forms. The separate formulation
by each of the performers of both the actus reus and the mens rea of
the offense distinguishes, therefore, their mutual relationship from
that of the perpetrator and the corporation as well as from that of
the aider-and-abettor and principal.
The perpetrator-corporation relationship is more similar to that
of the innocent agent and his principal8 7 than it is to that of parties
to a crime. However, even this comparison is not fully satisfactory.
The dependence of the corporation on the perpetrator is even
greater than the dependence of the innocent agent on his principal.
The innocent agent has the ability (and sometimes even the capac-
ity) to operate independently, but the corporation, by its very na-
ture, lacks any ability to function independently and is manipulated
by the principal just as raw material is molded by a craftsman.
3. Over-Personification
Excessive adherence to the doctrines of identification and im-
putation, upon which the perpetrator-corporation relationship is
based, could lead to the development of ideas that contradict basic
principles of penal law. In American case law, there is an emerging
approach according to which a corporation is convicted by combin-
ing the separate elements of conduct of its various agents to form a
single crime.88 This approach includes not only circumstances in
which B's knowledge combines with A's ignorant act, performed un-
hindered by B, to constitute an offense, as for instance, where one
manager intentionally does not prevent another from purchasing
goods for the company which the former knows to be stolen. Also
included are situations in which one agent is actually unaware of the
acts or knowledge of another agent.89
A United States federal court followed such an approach and
87 As to the doctrine of innocent agency, see P. GILLIES, supra note 81, at 138; W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 83, at 496-97;J. SMIm & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 119-
20 (5th ed. 1983); G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 368 (2d ed. 1983).
88 Comment, supra note 43, at 1248.
89 Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951); United
States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974); United States v.
Sawyer Transport Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 30-31 (D. Minn. 1971); People v. American
Medical Centers of Michigan, Ltd., 110 Mich. App. 135, 324 N.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 529 (1982).
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found a carrier liable for violating an Interstate Commerce regula-
tion by knowingly permitting a driver to operate a vehicle while ill.90
One employee put a driver on duty at his request knowing that pre-
viously the driver had asked to be discharged from work for medical
reasons but had changed his mind after hearing of the company's
new absentee procedure.9' Other agents of the corporate body were
aware that the new policy procedure was likely to have significant
effect on a driver's decision not to work due to illness. 92 Neither
agent had actual knowledge of the driver's impaired ability to drive,
and yet the court held that:
a corporation cannot plea innocence by asserting that the information
obtained by several employees was not acquired by any one individual
employee who then would have comprehended its full import. Rather
the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowl-
edge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act
accordingly. 93
A Michigan court was even more direct and explicit, recently stating
with regard to Medicaid fraud offenses: "The combined knowledge
of. . .employees may be imputed to a corporation to find it liable
for fraudulent acts."
94
Following the approach taken by the courts mentioned above,
however, might lead to the conviction of legal bodies under far-
reaching and absurd circumstances. For example, a corporation
might be held liable for knowingly accepting stolen property that
organ A acquired in good faith for the company, but which organ B
knows to be stolen, though he knows nothing about the purchase.
The trend that allows the conviction of a corporation by piecing
together the conduct of different agents so as to form the elements
of one offense is the result of over-personification of corporate bod-
ies. The proponents of this approach regard the actions and
thoughts of the separate organs or agents of the corporation as the
activities of distinct parts of a single consciousness. This analysis
would be accurate if the object under consideration were a human
organism. An individual is formed so that information is concen-
trated in one central intersection-the mind-which operates and
supervises the movements of the limbs. When the system functions
normally, behavior is controlled by a central intelligence system.
Consequently, a claim that the movements of various limbs were un-
90 United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974).
91 Id. at 735, 739.
92 Id. at 739.
93 Id. at 738.
94 People v. American Medical Centers of Michigan, Ltd., 118 Mich. App. 135, 156,
324 N.W.2d 782, 793 (1982).
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coordinated normally would be rejected. Indeed, the practical rea-
son underlying some of the criminal law defenses such as insanity,
intoxication and lack of volition, is that malfunctioning of the con-
trolling intelligence system should not be a cause for imposing lia-
bility. This line of argument cannot be applied to corporations.
The corporate entity lacks the corporal organ that centralizes infor-
mation and controls the activities of the limbs. It is artificial to ar-
gue in such circumstances that the total sum of the agents'
information exists in the "mind of the corporation," because this
"mind" is a fiction. The proponents of this approach are held cap-
tive by the legal presumption they have created, and refer to it as if
it were a reality, without discerning its limitations.9 5
Moreover, piecing together the knowledge of the different
agents to form the knowledge of the corporation does not conform
with the need to integrate the various elements of the offense as a
condition to its formation. This need to integrate expresses the re-
quirement of a casual connection between the conduct, as part of
the actus reus and the mens rea, and is known as the principle of con-
currence. It emphasizes that, in mens rea offenses, criminal liability
arises only when the forbidden act or omission is the consequence
of the criminal intent.9 6 The artificial process of "piecing together"
whereby the mens rea and actus reus of an offense are attributed to the
corporation cannot satisfy the demands of the principle of concur-
rence. Even the proponents of corporate criminal liability concede
that the corporate entity cannot by itself produce the elements nec-
essary to consummate the crime. These elements must first evolve
in the minds and actions of the perpetrators and only then, by way
of a legal fiction of identification or imputation, are they attributed
to the corporation. Hence, the link required by the concurrence
principle must also be supplied first by the organ or agent and only
then can it be ascribed to the corporation. However, when the
knowledge vital to the formation of the link is scattered in more than
one mind, the necessary link is obviously not manufactured by any
95 The English Law Commission opposed, therefore, the possibility "of piecing to-
gether several minds among the controlling officers of a company to render the com-
pany liable" and expressed the view that corporate criminal liability can be imposed only
when "at least one of its controlling officers has the elements" required. ENGLISH LAW
COMMISSION, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 41, at 27.
96 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Calig, 247 Mass. 20, 141 N.E. 510 (1923); Meli v. R.,.
[1954] 1 W.L.R. 28 (P.C.); R. v. Miller, [1983] 1 All E.R. 978; (H.L.) Fagan v. Commis-
sioner of Metropolitan Police, [ 1969] 1 Q.B. 439. See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 83, at 237-242; Marston, Contemporaneity of Act and Intention in Grimes, 86 L.Q. REv.
208 (1970); White, The Identity and Time of the Actus Reus, 1977 CRIM. L. REv. 148.
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human consciousness and it cannot, therefore, be claimed that the
criminal mind stimulated the forbidden act.
4. The Defenses
The criminal defenses define circumstances that absolve the act
of its criminal character. If the perpetrator-corporation relationship
can confer liability on the corporate body by ascribing to it criminal
acts and intents of the perpetrator, the corporation must be granted
access to the criminal defenses available to the perpetrator. How-
ever, criminal defenses which, when applied to human behavior, ex-
pose the sensitivity of the penal law to extraordinary situations lead
to absurd results when applied to situations where corporate liabil-
ity is in question.
Supporters of corporate criminal liability probably would allow
a claim of ignorance or mistake of fact in defense of the corporation.
Such a claim might be made, for example, when a manager autho-
rizes an illegal act in a reasonable though mistaken belief concern-
ing a material fact.97 But the corporation cannot raise other
defenses. To establish the defense of duress, for example, the ac-
cused must prove that he acted under the threat of death or serious
bodily harm. Yet, it is impossible to "threaten" the body or the life
of a corporate entity nor is it reasonable to assume that a threat to
the life or body of the manager translates into a threat on the "life"
or "body" of the corporation. The doctrines of identification or im-
putation ascribe only the actions of the organ or agent to the corpo-
ration; they do not argue that they are physiologically identical. 98
Similarly and notwithstanding the ascription of the knowledge of or-
gan or agent to the corporation according to the identification or
imputation doctrine, it is illogical to hold the corporation insane or
intoxicated.
These absurd results are avoided if the doctrines of identifica-
tion and imputation are limited to determine that the corporate
body is responsible for criminal conduct performed. Thus, the iden-
tification or imputation doctrines are applied only after the conduct
of the perpetrators has been held criminal, or in other words, only
after it is determined that an offense has been committed. The term
offense in this analysis would include not only the particular ele-
ments in the specific provision, but also the absence of conditions
and circumstances upon which a defense can be grounded. The cor-
97 See Chuter v. Freeth & Pocock Ltd., [1911] 2 K.B. 832, 836 (holding that corpora-
tion can believe statements in warranty given by its agent and thus be liable for those
statements if false).
98 See infra note 117.
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poration could be found liable accordingly only if the perpetrator
could be convicted for the activity ascribed to the corporation. Con-
versely, where a valid defense is available to the perpetrator so that
his act is absolved from criminality, the question of ascribing his
conduct to the corporate body becomes irrelevant. From a practical
standpoint, this approach appears to solve the difficulties inherent
in extending general defenses to corporate entities. Yet, from a
doctrinal perspective, this analysis again makes clear that the com-
mon vocabulary of the criminal law becomes foreign language when
applied to the body corporate.
C. PRACTICAL WEAKNESSES-SANCTIONING CORPORATIONS
To forward the basic goals of punishment, primarily retribution
and deterrence, the penal law contains a wide range of sanctions.
The system does not function efficiently, however, when applied to
the corporate body. The difficulties enountered become manifest in
two ways: the first relates to the palpable inability to impose several
modes of punishment on corporations; and the second accentuates
the ineffectiveness of sanctioning corporations.
1. Non-Economic Sanctions
Non-economic sanctions by their very nature are inapplicable to
corporate entities. The threat to life or liberty inherent in these
sanctions has validity and significance only within the human con-
text. Some 300 years ago, when corporal punishment was the only
criminal sanction, a defense counsel queried: "Must they hang up
the Common Seal?" 99 In a similar vein, the second Baron Thurlow
remarked that the corporation "has no soul to be damned and no
body to be kicked."' 00 Widening the spectrum of non-economic
sanctions has not altered the state of affairs. The most obvious ex-
ample is imprisonment. However, some other restraining measures
are also intrinsically inapplicable; and the present form of the pro-
bation system cannot be employed fully against corporations,
although legislators' 0 ' and courts10 2 have taken practical steps to
99 R. v. City of London, 8 St. Tr. 1039, 1138, 89 Eng. Rep. 930 (K.B. 1682).
100 R. CROSS & P. JONES, supra note 57, at 122.
101 See the conditions of probation in 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (effective Nov. 1, 1986). See
also Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2201(c) (1978); NAT'L
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT § 3001(4) (1971); Note,
Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discretion, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
637, 657-60 (1984).
102 See United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 59-61 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Apex Oil Co. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1292 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
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enlarge the scope of this measure in order to adapt it to corporate
entities. '
0 3
This inappropriateness practically narrows the scope of applica-
ble legal sanctions. Moreover, it a priori limits the capacity of the
penal system to achieve the goals to which punishment in general is
directed, for under certain circumstances (or with regard to certain
offenses) these ends could be better reached by using the inapplica-
ble non-economic sanctions.
2. Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions consist of varieties of fines and supplemen-
tary economic measures. There is no obstacle to subjecting corpo-
rate entities to this type of sanction because corporations usually
own property and are involved in economic activities. But the effec-
tiveness of applying economic sanctions to corporations, as well as
the fairness, necessity or the extent to which such application ad-
vances the purpose of punishment, is questionable.
Supplementary economic measures include forfeiture of prop-
erty or profits, temporary or permanent restraining orders, and the
revocation of licenses. These measures, however, supplement the
main punishment prescribed, and conviction usually is not a precon-
dition for their imposition.'
0 4
a. Pragmatic and Inherent Limitations
Fines are arguably the most appropriate punishment for corpo-
rations. The purpose of corporations is economic profit and busi-
ness operations almost always benefit, directly or indirectly, from
the criminal activity undertaken within the corporate framework.
103 See generally Coffee, "No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick:- An Unscandalized Inquiy Into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH L. REV. 386, 448-57 (1981); Metzger, supra
note 43, at 70-71; Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholar-
ship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 517 (1980); Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabili-
tation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 368-74 (1979).
One such suggestion includes requirements by courts for corporate contributions
to charity, which are in essence fines, as a condition of probation. See, e.g., United States
v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912-14 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitsub-
ishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787-89 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Danilow Pastry
Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see United States v. Prescon
Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1242-44 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor
Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1976). See generally Levin, supra
note 101; Note, Corporate Contributions to Charity As a Condition of Probation Under the Federal
Probation Act, 9 J. CORP. L. 241 (1984); Note, United States v. William Anderson Co.:
"Crime in the Suites, " Alternative Sentencing of Corporate Defendants, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1025 (1983).
104 See infra text accompanying notes 178-91.
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Thus, taxing the corporation will attack a vulnerable and appropri-
ate target. It would seem, therefore, that fines act as deterrents to
criminal negligence. Similarly, in cases of intentional criminal con-
duct, it is argued that the fine constitutes an appropriate levy on the
profits that the corporation sought to attain as a consequence of the
offense, thereby achieving the penal system's goals of both retribu-
tion and deterrence. 0 5 Moreover, fines should affect non-profit
corporations because these firms also have to act economically and
rationally.106 A more thorough analysis reveals, however, that im-
posing fines on corporations does not always advance the goals of
punishment.107
The maximum penalties provided by the specific criminal provi-
sions often are relatively low.108 Yet, low fines lack deterrent value.
Occasionally, a corporation might find it economically feasible to
risk that its activities might involve criminal transgressions, rather
than make the effort to prevent a breach of the law. For example,
the financial loss resulting from fines imposed by ordinances
prohibiting adulteration of food products is often considerably
smaller than the cost of replacing or improving the company's pro-
duction system. Moreover, the technique of accumulating offenses
or indictments to be tried together reduces even further the cost of
a single violation because in many cases the fine does not increase
proportionately to the number of violations considered at trial.
Supposedly, while this dilemma can be solved by increasing the
rates of the fines, 10 9 this solution is not problem-free."10
105 Metzger, supra note 43, at 65-66.
106 See generally Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Con-
duct, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400, 427 (1981) ("Even if corporations do not always
act as profit-maximizers, profit is the raison d'etre of corporate existence.").
107 Elkins, supra note 5, at 81; Fisse, supra note 11, at 1215; Metzger, supra note 43, at
65; Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime--A Problem in the Law of Sanction,
71 YALE L.J. 280, 285 (1961).
108 Davids, Penology and Corporate Crime, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
524, 527-29 (1967); Fisse, supra note 11, at 1215; Fisse, supra note 55, at 250-51; Geis,
Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM. L. BuLL. 377, 381 (1972); Metzger, supra
note 43, at 65-66; Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 40, 48 (1978); Note, supra note 107, at 287-88.
109 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §3571 (West 1985) (effective Nov. 1, 1986); S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1984). See also Elkins, supra note 5, at 81; Metzger, supra
note 43, at 66; Note, Corporate Contributions to Charity as a Condition of Probation Under the
Federal Act, supra note 103, at 243-44; Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation:
A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, supra note 103, at 362.
110 Some jurists suggest the imposition of fines scaled according to a corporation's
annual income or stock. See Davids, supra note 108, at 530; Elkins, supra note 5, at 81-82;
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 106, at 427; Note, supra note 107, at 295.
Another commentator has suggested that heavier fines should be collected in secur-
ities rather than in cash and that "[t]he convicted corporation should be required to
1985]
ELIEZER LEDERIVIAN
The size of the fine is not the only difficulty in this matter.
Sometimes it is illogical to impose a fine, however large, on the cor-
poration even when the offense committed had clear economic over-
tones. Frequently, corporate giants discover ways to transfer the
burden of the fine to their consumers by raising the prices of their
products or services.11'
Market forces, though, generally inhibit the transfer of the en-
tire burden of the fine to the consumers, particularly when competi-
tion is heavy and a price increase may lead the consumer to
purchase a competing product. Corporate manufacturers of prod-
ucts whose demand is elastic will hesitate to place the burden of the
fine on the public. Even monopolists may be disinclined to raise
prices because of possible decreases in sales and governmental reg-
ulation. Under other circumstances, however, fines will not have
this inhibiting effect on corporate bodies. In the absence of govern-
mental supervision, a corporation that manufactures an inexpensive,
commonly used item (and therefore is able to absorb the cost of the
fine by a small increase in price per unit) or a corporation that sup-
plies products or services which are in steady demand, can easily
transfer the burden of the penalty to the consumer. Any attempt to
prevent such apportionment of the fine, for example, by authorizing
the courts to prohibit such a price increase,1 2 probably would not
be successful. Such a prohibition would necessarily be confined to
authorize and issue such number of shares to the state's crime victim compensation fund
as would have an expected market value equal to the cash fine necessary to deter illegal
activity." Coffee, supra note 103, at 413. See also Fisse, supra note 11, at 1233-37; Metz-
ger, supra note 43, at 69-70.
Most of the Scandinavian countries have adopted the "day-fine" system in which the
number of the day-fines imposed on the convicted person represents the measure of the
punishment and the amount of each day is estimated on the basis of their income. See
Thornstedt, The Day-Fine System in Sweden, 1975 GRIM. L. REV. 307.
A common denominator underlying most of these various suggestions is their flexi-
bility. Though they may affect an overall increase in the rates of fines, they would intro-
duce a new element to the penal system, the offender's financial ability. This element is
appropriate in legal and administrative systems where the mode of progressive liability
is central to the system, e.g., in assessment and collection of tax or national social secur-
ity payments, but it is doubtful whether it is suitable in the realm of criminal law. The
severity of punishment must relate only to the severity of conduct. From this point of
view, the convict's wealth is relevant to the assessment of penalty only where it is directly
related to the profits accrued by the crime. A different approach would discriminate
against any wealthy offender whose capital may have been obtained in legal ways.
I I I G. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 863-64; Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A
Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419 (1980);
Coffee, supra note 103, at 401-02; Fisse, supra note 11, at 1219-20; Orland, supra note
103, at 516.
112 See McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability: An Eclectic Al-
ternative, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 989, 996 (1977).
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the costs of the fine and not to a price increase motivated by other
factors, and therefore the corporation easily could circumvent it.
Another deficiency of fines, especially relatively low ones, is that
in the business community they lose part of their criminal-punitive
impact. Many businessmen regard monetary penalties imposed on
corporations for a wide range of illegitimate activities as a "license
fee" 113 or the cost of conducting business.
114
Furthermore, sometimes the intrinsic nature of fines exposes a
severe limitation on their imposition on corporations. Some sup-
porters of corporate criminal liability claim that the corporate entity
potentially can be involved in almost the full range of offenses in
which individuals can be involved."15 But economic sanctions are
not a suitable reaction for all types of violations. If they were, the
other modes of punishment developed by the system would not be
needed. Thus, even assuming that corporations can be convicted of
grave offenses against the person or of severe harm caused to public
interest such as manslaughter 16 or endangering national security, a
fine is not of comparable penal value to the more severe punish-
ments imposed on human transgressors under similar
circumstances.
For this reason, many proponents of corporate criminal liability
concede that it is impossible to charge the corporation with offenses
for which the sole punishments meted out by the law are death or
compulsory incarcerations. 1 7 Some legal systems feel that this is a
113 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1943).
114 Metzger, supra note 43, at 65-66; Orland, supra note 103, at 516; Spurgeon &
Fagan, supra note 106, at 427.
115 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
116 See, e.g., Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 149 Cal. App. 3d
465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1984); Commonwealth v. Frontner L.P. Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 103 A. 685 (NJ. 1917). Cf. People
v. Warner Lambert Co., 51 N.Y. 2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980);
State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961). But see Vaughan & Sons,
Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); R. v. Cory Bros. and Co., [1927]
1 K.B. 810. See also supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
117 People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936); State v. Truax, 130 Wash. 69,
226 P. 259 (1924); R. v. I.C.R., Haulage Ltd., [1944] K.B. 551, 554; D.P.P. v. Kent and
Sussex Contractors, Ltd., [1944] K.B. 146, 149. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 484-
91; but cf. Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 149 Cal. App. 3d
465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1984).
The English Law Commission made the ostensibly logical proposition that "if...
the person identified with the company is an embodiment of it, and his guilty mind is the
guilty mind of the company, it ought to follow that imprisonment of that individual is
imprisonment of the company with which he is identified." ENGLISH LAw COMMISSION,
CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 41, at 27. Yet, the Commission went on
to say that "however logical, this seems to be absurd and cannot be regarded as an
acceptable result in practice." See supra text accompanying note 98.
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technical barrier only, easily circumvented by enacting express pro-
visions substituting imprisonment for a fine when the accused is a
corporation.""8 Such legislation, however, expresses a lack of sensi-
tivity to the real significance of the corporal punishment imposed by
criminal law in cases of severe offenses which recognizes and em-
phasizes that such violations cannot be absolved by monetary sanc-
tions alone.
b. Effectiveness of the Punishment
From the perspective of legal policy, the process of expanding
the scope of criminal law to include corporations can be justified
only if such expansion causes increased obedience to the provisions
of criminal law. Corporate delinquency is only a metaphorical term,
despite the fact that certain categories of offenses can be violated
primarily within the corporate framework (for example, infractions
of the banking law, insurance law, and antitrust law). Such delin-
quency is merely the result of illegal human conduct because "com-
panies are not delinquent, only people are." 1 9 Therefore, the
question is whether imposing criminal liability on the corporation
will be a deterrent or retributive force that might inhibit the criminal
activity of the individuals involved in the operation of the corporate
entity. 120 Without empirical data, this problem can be examined
only theoretically.
i. retribution:
Retribution is probably not a significant justification for impos-
ing liability on corporations. 12 1 The possibility of justifying the
punishment of corporations on the basis of the principle of retribu-
tion is limited for two reasons. First, many jurists tend to belittle the
value of the principle of retribution because of its inherent emo-
tional ingredient which stands in direct opposition to the practical
118 Fine in lieu of imprisonment for corporations is available in several states. See, e.g.,
Ky. REV. STAT. § 534.050 (referred to in Fortner L.P. Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d at 942); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51 (discussed in Anderson, supra note 4, at 239-40). See also 18
U.S.C. § 3571(b)(2)(A) (West 1985) (effective Nov. 1, 1986).
The same line of reasoning exists in other penal codes. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT § 44(3) (1954). See also Comment, supra note 32, at 93-95 (no
substantive objection for committing a corporation for trial, even on charge of murder).
119 Andrews, Reform in the Law of Corporate Liability, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 91, 94.
120 Many commentators argue that corporate personnel are not amenable to rehabili-
tation, which is regarded as another goal of criminal sanction. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE
LiMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356 (1968); McAdams, supra note 112, at 992.
121 Braithwaite, ChallengingJust Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 723, 724-30 (1982); Coffee, supra note 103, at 448; Comment, supra note
54, at 582-85; Note, supra note 103, at 360-61; Note, supra note 43, at 1234.
[Vol. 76314
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
aims of punishment. 122 Second, and more importantly, the objective
of redeeming society and the victim through punishment is not ad-
vanced by sanctioning corporate entities.
The principle of retribution has two aspects. It is rooted in the
instinctive need to take vengeance against wrongdoers and legiti-
mizes the expression of anger and hate. Also, retribution is aimed at
encouraging the feelings of the law-abiding by insuring that there is
no profit in criminal wrongdoing.
As to the first aspect, the release of these emotions is possible
mainly because the punishment is imposed directly and immediately
on the wrongdoer whose criminal thoughts and actions resulted in
the illegal outcome. In this context, it is very apparent that the cor-
porate entity is devoid of independent thought and action and that
these qualities are attributed to it by force of fiction alone. As it is
difficult to view the corporation in physical terms as the "perpetra-
tor of the crime," this aspect of the principle of retribution loses its
significance. Furthermore, the intangibility of the body incorporate
makes it insensitive to punishment as a social reaction. In big cor-
porations, the sanction is absorbed by the human factors standing
behind the corporate veil-the shareholders-most of whom are
usually innocent of any criminal involvement. Under these circum-
stances, the principle of retribution is not satisfied, because a third
party and not the real offender is the direct object of the punish-
ment. Hence, imposition of criminal liability on the corporation
does not restore the unfairness caused by the perpetrator's conduct
because it does not achieve a social balance between the offense and
the punishment whereby one offsets the other.
As to the other aspect of retribution, intended to prevent the
profitability of criminal activity, economic offenses committed
within the framework of corporations create profits accumulated by
violating the law. Such unlawful profits, when distributed among
the shareholders, may infringe upon the fair social balance in the
community. 123 This problem of unfair distribution of social re-
sources in society can be solved, however, by suitable forfeiture pro-
ceedings held against the corporation as a result of convicting the
perpetrator, rather than by convicting the corporate entity itself.1
24
ii. deterrence:
Proponents of the personification doctrine argue that even a
122 Note, supra note 43, at 1234.
123 Fisse, supra note 11, at 1169-80.
124 See infra text accompanying notes 178-89. But see Fisse, supra note 11, at 1167-83.
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corporate entity can be deterred by the threat of "suffering."' 125 De-
terrence is aimed primarily, however, at human consciousness. It is
a utilitarian concept based on the assumption that the individual is a
rational creature who chooses paths of action which will result in the
greatest benefit. One researcher has maintained that deterrence ef-
ficiency is not identical under all circumstances and with regard to
all offenses. 126 Yet, even when deterrence is relatively effective, it is
doubtful whether imposing criminal liability on the corporation, as
well as on the perpetrator, makes it more effective.
In small closely-held firms, where power is concentrated in the
hands of a few promoters or shareholders, the perpetrator generally
will be among them. In such cases, imposing a fine on the corpora-
tion amounts to a circuitous path to a goal which could be attained
by increasing the fine imposed directly on the the perpetrator of the
offense. 127 The argument that liability should be imposed on the
corporate entity, because the perpetrator may not have sufficient
means with which to pay off the fine, becomes less significant under
these circumstances. In most closely-held enterprises, the actual
performer of the offense also owns stock in the corporate body and
if necessary, can liquidate it.
On the other hand, large corporations are characterized by divi-
sions of authority, ownership and performance. The multitude of
stockholders are physically distant from, and uninvolved in, the ac-
tivities taking place at the power center of the organization. 128 De-
terrence then becomes discredited because often the corporate
liability does not supplement the liability of the perpetrators but
rather replaces it.
125 United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332, 335 (Ist Cir. 1978).
Fisse analyzes the deterrence value of criminal stigma, supra note 11, at 1147-54, and
reaches the conclusion that "deterrence in corporate criminal law depends not only on the
infliction of monetary loss but also on criminal stigma, impact upon nonfinancial motiva-
tions of corporate decisionmakers, and activation of internal discipline and organiza-
tional reform." Id. at 1166 (emphasis added). But see H. PACKER, supra note 120, at 361;
Elkins, supra note 5, at 78; Note, supra note 43, at 1365-66.
126 See E. SuTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 217-33 (1961); Sutherland, Crime of Cor-
porations, in WHrrE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 57-70 (G. Geis ed. 1968).
127 Cf Woods, supra note 53, at 1177.
128 For a discussion concerning the distinction between large corporations and other
corporations, see Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?,
in THE CORPORATION IN THE MODERN SOCIETY 303 (E. Mason ed. 1959). The writer calls
the large corporations "endocratic corporations," defined as "large, publicly-held cor-
poration[s], whose stock is scattered in small fractions among thousands of stockhold-
ers." All other corporations he entitles "exocratic corporations," characterized by being
controlled by a small group of shareholders. The same terminology was used in Com-
monwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 277-78, 275 N.E.2d 33, 84 (1971);
Note, supra note 107, at 291.
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In legal systems that apply the doctrine of the organs of the
corporation, such replacement generally is limited to administrative
offenses. As to mens rea offenses, since corporate criminal liability is
imposed only after proving that all the elements of the offense exist
with respect to the organ, the organ who peformed the crime must
be identified. In the United States, however, the replacement of the
perpetrator's liability with that of the corporation has spread to of-
fenses of criminal intent too. The courts have admitted the possibil-
ity of imposing liability on the corporation when the mens rea offense
clearly was carried out within the corporate framework, yet the per-
petrator cannot be pinpointed. 129 Consequently, for example, there
are fewer cases in which directors, managers or other supervisors or
officers stand trial side by side with the corporation for violations of
the antitrust law.1
3 0
Prosecuting the corporation alone usually is a direct result of
the difficulties in identifying the perpetrator, a problem which is
proportional to the size and complexity of the corporation.' 3 ' The
process of recognizing and legitimizing the prosecution of the cor-
poration alone has, however, strong internal dynamics of its own.
The police and other investigative authorities are liable to be satis-
fied with a less thorough examination in the attempt to discover the
actual perpetrators of the crime, content that they have fulfilled
their duties by placing the corporation on trial.132 Somejurists have
defended imposing liability on the corporation alone on grounds of
justice, convenience and economic considerations exclusively, and
see no flaw in such reasoning even when the identity of the perpe-
trator is known.'33 This attitude provides fertile ground for plea-
bargaining deals between the managers or directors and the prosec-
tion, whereby the corporate entity will admit guilt on the condition
that its managers or directors will not stand trial.
The available means of investigation are possibly less effective
in uncovering the actual performers of a criminal offense within
129 See, e.g., United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 969 (1963); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d
376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); Note, supra note 43, at 1248-49.
130 See, e.g, Note, supra note 107, at 292-93. See also Fisse, supra note 55, at 260; Kad-
ish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 423, 431-33 (1963).
131 ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 41, at
31-32; E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 126, at 228-29; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 865;
Elkins, supra note 5, at 83-84; Maakestad, supra note 3, at 879; Metzger, supra note 43, at
56; Note, supra note 103, at 357-59.
132 See Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEx. L. REv. 60, 72-73 (1968).
133 See Elkins, supra note 5, at 82-83. But see Edgerton, supra note 5, at 834-35; Note,
supra 107, at 292; See also L. LEIGH, supra note 5, at 142-43.
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large corporate bodies. The authorities, therefore, prefer to turn to
easier prey - the corporation - especially where petty offenses are
involved. However, concentration on the liability of the corporation
rather than on that of the human offenders indicates that the author-
ities have capitulated to the problem, which makes matters worse.
Thus, perpetrators may believe that even when they are to be identi-
fied, they would not be tried and the police and prosecution would
be satisfied with convicting the corporation. This phenomenon un-
doubtedly has a powerful anti-deterrent effect.
134
Another argument advanced in favor of corporate liability is
that it is an additional deterrent to the perpetrator when he is ex-
posed to a hostile reaction on the part of the shareholders or his
supervisors following the predicament of the corporation due to his
offense. This argument is also questionable. Such a reaction
against the perpetrator can take only one of two forms: either firing
the perpetrator or filing a derivative suit against him for reimburse-
ment of the damage resulting from the conviction of the corporate
body.135 Nothing, however, prevents criminal law from exposing
the perpetrator directly to punishments similar to the threat of the
derivative suit or dismissal.
An appropriate substitute for the threat of being dismissed
would be a prohibition against the perpetrator from serving in a di-
rective or managerial capacity in corporate entities. Such a sanction
is even more efficient than mere dismissal. Stockholders can dis-
charge the perpetrator only from their specific corporation, but if
convicted criminally, a general prohibition would prevent him from
holding similar positions in other corporate bodies as well.' 36
Similarly, the personal criminal summons has greater deterrent
effect on the perpetrator than the derivative suit. A criminal sum-
mons contains broader possibilities of operation and, following con-
viction, the appropriate sanction can be chosen from a wide arsenal
of punishments. The derivative suit, on the other hand, only ex-
poses the perpetrator to monetary sanctions and is used infre-
quently because the perpetrator often does not have the financial
ability to make good the damage caused to a large corporation.
134 Cf NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 40, at
190.
135 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963);
Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 143, 157 (1961);
Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 (1967); Comment, Federal
Antitrust Law--Stockholders' Remedies for Corporate Injury Resulting from Antitrust Violations:
Derivative Antitrust Suit and Fiduciary Duty Action, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 904 (1961).
136 See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
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c. Fairness of the Punishment
Taking punitive measures against large corporations in re-
sponse to the offenses of its organs or agents is unfair and raises a
moral issue. Due to the distinction between perpetrators and own-
ers in these corporate bodies, the burden of sanctions for the crimi-
nal conduct of the former must be borne by the latter.' 37
. Dubious arguments are proposed by corporate criminal liability
proponents to justify the injury to shareholders. One approach sug-
gests that shareholders usually are directly involved in the delin-
quent activity because the determination of basic policy often is
made after consulting them and obtaining their approval. 138 How-
ever, only a few of the offenses committed within the framework of
big corporations concern basic policy decisions requiring the in-
volvement of stockholders. When this occurs the stockholders be-
come parties to the offense and are directly responsible for its
commission. Therefore, punishing them indirectly by rendering the
corporation liable is unnecessary; direct conviction is much more
effective and offers a wider range of possible punishments.
Another approach contends that stockholders are liable due to
negligence. The theory is that stockholders have direct-or at least
indirect-power to choose and supervise the high echelons of the
corporation and the commission of the offense proves that they ac-
ted negligently in exercising their authority. 139 This reasoning is
problematic. Even assuming such negligence, which is questiona-
ble, it would merely justify enacting a specific provision dealing with
it. Such a provision would impose on the shareholders direct crimi-
nal responsibility upon proving both their negligence in the direct
or indirect choice or supervision of the directors or managers, and
the causal connection between that negligence and the criminal act
committed. Nevertheless, this argument cannot be the basis for im-
posing on the shareholders any responsibility beyond that of negli-
gence. The stockholders should not be burdened with liability for
the reckless or intentional conduct of the directors or the managers.
Rendering the corporation liable for offenses performed by the di-
rectors or the managers involving the elements of intent or reckless-
ness will injure the negligent stockholders to a greater extent than
that justified by the gravity of their conduct. 140
Moreover, the "fault" theory is dubious because the larger the
137 Edgerton, supra note 5, at 836-40; Fisse, supra note 11, at 1219.
138 See Winn, supra note 5, at 410-412.
139 See Mueller, supra note 6, at 39.
140 But see Mueller, supra note 6, at 39-41.
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size of the corporate body the more it becomes remote from reality.
Although a stock certificate represents ownership, individual stock-
holders of small amounts in large corporations lack the power to
control or supervise-directly or indirectly-the activities of the en-
tity. Stockholders have only scanty knowledge of the corporate
structure, the flow of daily transactions, the process of decision mak-
ing and the peformance of those who fulfill the directive or manage-
rial positions. The physical separation of the stockholders from
each other and from the corporation, their inability to communicate
with one another, the complexity of the business transactions, and
the minimal amount of knowledge offered by the entity to the stock-
holders has caused the stockholders' power to be merely theoretical
and has made the argument concerning their ability to control the
corporation fictional.
14
The absurdity in the suggestion that the stockholder is some-
what "at fault" is even more salient when an offense is performed by
an underling of the corporation over whom the stockholders do not
have even theoretical indirect control. Furthermore, this argument
certainly is inapplicable when the shareholder purchased stock after
the offense had occurred, but prior to the conviction and sentencing
of the corporation. Similarly, this argument provides no answer to
situations in which the shareholder opposed the appointment of the
director or manager who perpetrated the offense for which the cor-
poration eventually was convicted. Under these circumstances,
there is no justification for placing the burden of the penalty on the
individual stockholder whose actions are without blame.
Another claim has been made that associating with corpora-
tions, which are commercial entities, is a gamble involving risks as
well as opportunities.' 42 When making an investment decision, the
shareholder must weigh, among other things, the risk that the cor-
poration might be convicted of illegal activity. According to this ap-
proach there is no distinction between the injurious effect of
criminal conviction and other possible injuries resulting from mis-
management of the corporation or from civil liability imposed on
the corporation in tort or contract. The supporters of this reason-
ing argue that the harm to an individual shareholder resulting from
141 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); NAT'L
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 40, at 191; ENGLISH LAW
COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 32-33; L. LEIGH, supra note 5, at 151; G. WILLIAMS, supra
note 24, at 863; Burrows, supra note 5, at 4; Edgerton, supra note 5, at 836-37; Metzger,
supra note 43, at 2; Comment, supra note 5, at 187; Note, supra note 103, at 355-56.
142 See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 5, at 82; McAdams, supra note 112, at 995; Note, supra
note 43, at 1242-43.
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corporate criminal liability is not serious and is limited to a part of
the investment. Furthermore, the impact of this harm is spread
among the stockholders proportionate to their share in the
profits. 143
Yet, the imposition of small injustices is also not justifiable.
The techniques of dividing the total harm into small portions and
separately examining the injury caused to each stockholder distorts
the general picture. Only the examination of the damage to stock-
holders as a whole evaluates its gravity correctly. As for the assump-
tion of risk by the shareholders, its relevance declines as the offense
committed within the corporation's framework becomes more
grave. The stockholder hardly can be expected to foresee the possi-
bility of the management's or employee's conscious entanglement in
grave criminal activity. 14
4
Neither the comparison of the damage to stockholders ensuing
from the imposition of a criminal fine on the corporation to the bur-
den they must bear when tortious damages are awarded against the
corporation nor the attempt to view both as costs of doing business
is convincing.' 45 Both the criminal and the civil proceedings result
in a financial loss, but the concept of compensation is different from
the concept of the criminal fine. The injury to the stockholder
which is the outcome of a tort claim, even though it may be unjusti-
fied, forwards the goals of the law of torts. The award of compensa-
tion constitutes an attempt to limit, in the fairest manner, the
general harm caused by the tortious conduct, and to ameliorate the
damage caused to the injured party. The economic capacity of cor-
porate entities to contribute to the advancement of this policy is sig-
nificant. On the other hand, serious doubts exist whether
burdening the shareholders advances the aims of penal law. Crimi-
nal proceedings are meant to examine the responsibility of the ac-
cused with respect to the illegal outcome of his conduct and to
punish him if found guilty. There is no reason to cause damage to
those who did not participate in the prohibited act and who, in most
cases, did not even have the power to prevent it.
Some commentators claim that fining a corporation is merely a
form of withholding illegally accumulated profits. 146 Corporate
143 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 33; W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING
SociEY 209 (2d ed. 1972); Edgerton, supra note 5, at 837; Elkins, supra note 5, at 82;
Winn, supra note 5, at 412-13; Comment, supra note 5, at 185.
144 ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 33.
145 See also supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 21, at 186; Metzger, supra note 43, at 65; Comment,
supra note 3, at 921; see also Fisse, supra note 11, at 1171.
1985]
ELIEZER LEDERMAN
bodies should be deprived of their unlawful profits and in this con-
text the issue of unfairly harming the innocent shareholders abso-
lutely does not arise. However, to combine fining with forfeiture of
illegal profits is improper and reveals a difficulty. First, the intent
to deprive the corporate body of its illegal profits cannot serve as a
sweeping justification to fine it in every case following its conviction,
because only in some instances is the unlawful activity within the
corporate framework profitable. Moreover, a fine is a rough and un-
suitable tool for absorbing illegal gains. It is a purely punitive mea-
sure and should be reserved solely for achieving sanctioned ends.
Therefore, there is no necessary connection between the size of the
fine and the amount of the accumulated illegal profits. The goal of
abrogating the corporation of its unlawful profits is achieved better
by using forfeiture proceedings, which are adjusted and designated
for this aim and do not require the conviction of the corporate body
as a prerequisite for its application.
1 47
Some jurists have belittled the harm caused to the stockholders
by comparing it to the suffering of the family of a convicted criminal
who must serve his sentence. 148 A certain similarity does exist be-
tween the two groups. Neither a stockholder of a corporation nor
the accused's family stand trial and the judgement is not directed
personally against them. But, the similarity ends there. The suffer-
ing of the family is a side effect and the convicted offender person-
ally carries the heaviest burden of the punishment. The situation of
the shareholders differs greatly. The corporation itself is incapable
of absorbing the punishment, therefore, the stockholders must pay
the price. Moreover, the obligations cannot be compared because
the willingness and the devotion inherent in the human relation-
ships of the family unit are not part of the relationship between the
stockholder and the corporation. Most people are prepared, under
most circumstances, to sacrifice and suffer injuries on behalf of a
family member, and therefore, their sense of injustice is not heavy.
In contrast, the relationship between the corporation and the share-
holder, especially that between a small investor and a large corpora-
tion, is purely economic and lacks emotional content.
d. Necessity of the Punishment
The supporters of imposing criminal liability on large corpora-
tions argue that often the violation of law cannot be attributed to an
147 See supra text accompanying notes 178-89.
148 Braithwaite, supra note 121, at 729; Fisse, supra note 11, at 1174-75; Winn, supra
note 5, at 412.
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individual's initiative and conduct only, but rather is the result of the
policy of the corporation or of the basic defects in the mode of oper-
ation and organization of the corporate entity.149 Sometimes the
atmosphere at the enterprise exerts pressures and indirectly encour-
ages illegal activity. Frequently, the illegal activities are directed by
the management hierarchy and augmented by pressures that can be
traced to interested parties behind the scenes. The difficulty arises,
the proponents argue, because those who are really responsible find
shelter behind the corporate veil or in the labyrinth of its compli-
cated structure and cannot be located. 150 According to this view-
point, punishing the actual perpetrator of the offense is not
sufficient and the harm done to the interest of the corporate body as
a whole is a good substitute for the inability of the penal law to lo-
cate and strike the real offenders.
The deficiency of this argument lies in its generalizations as
well as in the spirit of the solution it offers. The attempt to explain
the violations of law within the framework of corporate bodies as the
outcome of a conspiracy of hidden pressures seems to be based on
assumption and speculation rather than on serious empirical study.
If the directors, managers or stockholders exerted pressures and
created an unhealthy climate of improper working methods, then
the individuals involved should be charged on the basis of personal
and direct liability as accomplices to the offense. This method of
direct liability is a more effective deterrent than punishing those
figures indirectly via the medium of corporate liability.
Moreover, if the leading officers of the corporation encourage
criminal activity and are able to muster the support of stockholders
for such activity, then the remedy is the liquidation of the entire
framework. There is no justification for the existence of a corpora-
tion which operates and advances its business goals by way of regu-
lar and frequent criminal activity. The state is responsible for
dissolving it. Yet, such a measure could be taken without subjecting
the corporation as such to criminal proceedings; rather, dissolution
could be a complementary measure taken after the trial of the actual
perpetrator of the offense.151 If, on the other hand, the suspicions
against the stockholders and the high echelons of the corporate hi-
149 See, e.g., Fisse, supra note 11, at 1190-92; see also Note, supra note 43, at 1243.
150 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); ENGLISH
LAW COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 31-32; Burrows, supra note 5, at 19; Kadish, supra
note 130, at 43 1; Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases-Their Implications for Govern-
ment and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 106 (1961).
151 See infra text accompanying and following note 190.
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erarchy are unfounded, there is no legal basis for harming them by
punishing the corporate body.
The argument that because it is impossible to identify the true
offenders in the absence of proof of guilt on the part of the direc-
tors, managers or stockholders, criminal liability must be imposed
on the corporation, is incompatible with the principle of personal
liability. It is stretching the point to consider penalizing the corpo-
rate body as a collective punishment in every respect,1 52 because the
shareholders are not directly punished. However, corporate liabil-
ity, like collective liability, imposes the burden of the sanction on
individuals whose involvement in the transgression has not been
proven and whose sole fault lies in their being part of a group con-
nected to the offender. But it is a basic principle of criminal law that
collective punishment is strictly prohibited, for as one jurist aptly
stated, collective responsibility "may be an effective way of enforc-
ing law and order, but it does violence to our more sophisticated
present-day conceptions of justice."'
' 53
IV. TOWARDS PERSONAL LIABILITY
A. IMPOSING PERSONAL LIABILITY
1. The Suggested Approach
The alternative theory to imposing criminal liability on the cor-
poration emphasizes the personal liability of the individual actually
involved in the violation of the law. Commensurate with directly
punishing the perpetrator of the crime or those responsible for it,
the alternative approach suggests that, where appropriate, comple-
mentary actions be taken against the corporation. Beyond these
general propositions, an exception has been made with respect to
penal legislation of a regulatory or an administrative character.
There are two closely connected basic starting points of the
suggested approach. First, the penal system is designed to protect
the public order by directing its commands to individuals and
threatening them with punishment in case of violation. It should
strive to achieve its goal in a similar manner where human activity
within the framework of the corporate bodies is concerned. Sec-
ondly, it follows that corporations are not an object of criminal law
152 Some jurists argue that collective punishment is the proper starting point for ex-
amining corporate criminal liability. See, e.g., S. HURWITZ, BIDRAG TIL LAEREN OM KOL-
LEKTIVE ENHEDERS PONALE ANSVAR (Copenhagen, 1933); see also J. ANDENAES, THE
GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF NORWAY 245 (1965); H. MANNHEIM, GROUP
PROBLEMS IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 43 (enl. 2d ed. 1971).
153 Comment, supra note 11, at 717 n.102.
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and should not be treated as offenders, at least with respect to sub-
stantive criminal law as opposed to administrative strict liability pro-
visions. 154 The corporate entity is a tool in the hands of the actual
perpetrator and should be dealt with accordingly.
This line of reasoning, which corresponds with the trends of
European-Continental Law,1 55 assumes that if criminal law "takes
care of individual responsibility the group will take care of itself." 156
The theory of corporate criminal liability likewise does not preclude
the imposition of personal liability on the perpetrator. Its support-
ers have consistently emphasized that the threat to the corporate
body serves only as an additional deterrent aimed at influencing the
behavior of its human constituents. 57 However, notwithstanding
this proclaimed objective, attention often has strayed and focused
on the corporation as a target of the legal sanctions. To a consider-
able extent, this tendency has dulled the impact of direct personal
liability of the perpetrator.158
2. Perpetration on Behalf of the Corporation
The suggested approach, like the core of criminal law, focuses
primarily on the personal liability of the perpetrator. It asserts that
every director, manager, employee, agent, stockholder or other
functionary of the corporation whose behavior warrants the imposi-
tion of criminal liability should stand trial personally for his activi-
ties. It is irrelevant whether the individual acted in the name of the
corporate entity or on its behalf. When the issue is the personal
liability of the perpetrator, no distinction should be made between
sole perpetrators who have committed the offense personally and
those who are bound up in a web of complicity or conspiracy.' 59
The question of personal liability must be determined as if the per-
petrator acted on his own behalf, regardless of whether the conduct
154 Andrews, supra note 119, at 94.
155 See ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 12-15; Mueller, supra note 6, at 28-
35. For a description of the situation in Continental Europe, seeJ. ANDENAES, supra note
152, at 244 (Norway); H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTs (AlIgemeiner Teil) 171
(2. Aufl. 1974) (Germany); V. MANZINI, TRATrATO DI DiRrrro PENALE ITALIANO 535
(1961) (Italy); G. STEFANI & G. EVASSEUR, DRorr P9NAL GENERAL ET PROCEDURE PENALE
para. 245 (6. ed. 1972) (France).
156 Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REv. 305, 319 (1924).
157 The Queen v. Great N. of England Ry. Co., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298 (Q.B.
1846).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 128-34.
159 See, e.g., United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 442
(2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Amrep. Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 545 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Berger, 456 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
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was performed allegedly in the name of the corporation or on its
behalf. 
160
The aforementioned principle, which is incorporated in several
proposed codes, 61 is designed primarily to clarify the issues. It pre-
cludes any attempt by the perpetrator to avoid liability when all the
elements of the offense originate in his behavior. Yet, precise legal
interpretation of the verbs, terms or provisions of a specific criminal
statute may raise doubts as to whether a particular act, which was
allegedly performed in the name of the legal body or on its behalf,
can be considered the performer's individual act.162 The principle
stated would preclude, for example, a manager of a real estate leas-
ing corporation who signs a rental contract in the name of the cor-
poration while knowing that the property would be used for
immoral purposes from claiming that the corporation that owned
the property was the lessor and that he is not personally responsi-
ble. Similarly, an employee of a legal entity, who sells unlawfully
manufactured goods belonging to the corporation and deposits the
money into the corporation's cash register would be prevented from
claiming that he was not the seller.
3. Offenses Attributed Solely to the Corporation
Occasionally, the criminal norm is directed only towards a party
who has fulfilled a particular prerequisite, and sometimes it is the
corporate body which answers to the condition. Examples are
where the criminal legislation refers to licensees or property owners
who happen to be corporations, or where the definition of the of-
fense applies to the employer, a title which, in the particular case,
fits only the corporation and not the human being who carried out
the offense. If the individual who perpetrated the offense in the em-
ployment were brought to trial, the individual might argue that the
governing statute does not apply to him. In other words, the ac-
cused might argue that he lacks the power, status, capacity or au-
thority referred to in the statute. The argument appears even more
persuasive when raised with respect to omissions, i.e., where the
statute imposes a positive duty which, under the circumstances, is
directed at the corporation.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962); United States v. Amrep.
Corp. 560 F.2d 539, 545 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Brickey, Criminal
Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses- Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337,
1339-40 (1982); Note, supra note 43, at 1265-66.
161 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(6)(a) (1962); NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 101, § 403(1).
162 See, e.g., People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 606, 2 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1936).
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This argument could be counteracted by specific legislation ex-
plicity stating that where a provision refers to a condition or de-
scription which in the particular case suits only the corporate body,
the law ascribes that condition or description to certain functiona-
ries within the corporate hierarchy, such as directors, managers and
other officers. 163 An alternate legislative technique would be to
maintain that each member of the corporate hierarchy falling into
one of the specific categories is deemed liable for such a transgres-
sion, unless the person can prove that they were not involved in its
commission. In the case of crimes of omission, the individual will
have to show that he took all necessary precautions to ensure com-
pliance with the law.
These two proposals are similar but not identical, as becomes
evident when analyzing crimes of commission as opposed to crimes
of omission. The first alternative does not deviate from the tradi-
tional principle of the onus of proof in criminal law. It merely sug-
gests that responsibility be attributed to those personnel whose
thoughts and actions are proved by the prosecution to form the ele-
ments of the specific offense. The second alternative is much
broader. It establishes a presumption of guilt, albeit rebuttable,
upon proof of both an actus reus and the defendant's fulfillment of
one of the roles specified in the statute. In accordance with the sub-
ject at hand, the legislator should determine which technique is
more appropriate and whether the categories of persons potentially
liable for the offense should be widened or narrowed.
4. Managerial and Supervisory Responsibility
The suggested approach acknowledges the importance of in-
creasing the supervision and involvement of the senior officers of
the corporation by emphasizing their personal and direct liability
for the events taking place in the corporate body which they super-
vise.1' 4 Primafacie there is no room to distinguish in this regard be-
tween the senior officials of incorporated and unincorporated
enterprises. Such a generalization, however, deserves a more thor-
ough examination than is possible within the scope of this study.
a. Knowledge of Subordinates' Intent
When corporate supervisors are aware of a subordinate's crimi-
nal design, they should be required to employ all possible means to
163 See MODEL PENAL Code § 2.07(6)(b) (1962); NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 101, § 403(2).
164 See Metzger, supra note 43, at 55; Note, supra note 43, at 1261.
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prevent a transgression. Although legal systems tend to limit the
resort to statutory offenses of omission, an exception should be
made here. The corporate body is a closed system with a defined
hierarchy. Imposing duties upon the figures in authority will in-
crease and emphasize their particular responsibility for the events
taking place within the corporate entity. The power to control and
supervise, which carries many advantages, must also entail duties.1 65
There is no intention to impose liability on directors, managers
and other supervisors for all offenses which happen to occur during
working hours (such as petty thefts of one worker from another at
work). The suggested duty should extend only to offenses directly
connected to work. Moreover, in order to prevent an atmosphere of
informing and eavesdropping, the positive duty imposed on the se-
nior officers should not necessitate divulging to the authorities the
identities of the designers of the offense. Rather, the duty should
focus on the undertaking to prevent the illegal act or to curtail it.
Under most circumstances, those obliged to act can do so without
depending on police assistance because of their status and relation-
ship with the designers.
Directors, managers or other supervisors who did not fulfill the
duty under discussion can be incriminated, within the context of the
complicity doctrine, because they are aiders-and-abettors. The duty
of the senior officers to act derives from their relationship with their
subordinates as well as from obligations imposed by public inter-
est. 166 Therefore, in terms of the actus reus, any director, manager,
or other supervisor who is aware of an employee's criminal design
and is able to take preventive measures but does nothing contrib-
utes to the performance of the offense. With respect to the mens rea,
such a conscious failure to take preventive measures is an omission
which reflects that person's intent to aid in the commission of the
offense. 167 Alternatively, similar results can be reached by adopting
a general principle that would specifically establish the direct and
independent responsibility of the managerial and supervisory eche-
165 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 83, at 186.
166 See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 160, at 1342; Note, supra note 43, at 1266-70; Note,
Individual Liability of Agents for Corporate Crimes Under the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 31
VAND. L. REV. 965, 970-71 (1978).
167 See Morgan v. United States, 149 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731
(1945); Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467, 471-72, 139 S.E. 77, 78-79 (1927); State v.
Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196, 216-17, 251 N.W. 478, 485 (1933); Tuck v. Robson, [1970] 1 All
E.R. 1171, 1174-75 (Q.B.); Rubie v. Faulkner, [1940] 1 K.B. 571, 574-75; Gough v.
Rees, 29 Cox C.C. 74, 79-80 (K.B. 1929); Du Cros v. Lambourne, [1907] 1 K.B. 40, 45-
46; Howells v. Wynne, 143 Eng. Rep. 682, 688 (C.P. 1863). See also W. LAFAVE & A.
Sco-rr, supra note 83, at 504; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 361, 866.
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Ions for offenses committed within the scope of their supervision
and authority in cases where they were aware of the criminal design
but did not take reasonable measures to prevent its completion.
b. Recklessness or Negligence
In addition, legislatures should enact general provisions to ad-
dress defective supervision or management of the corporate body
and impose, as a result thereof, separate and independent responsi-
bility. Such legislation, which might be divided into separate cate-
gories of recklessness and negligence, supplements the other form
of management and supervisory liability discussed above.
168
The proposal suggested would be applicable only if the prose-
cution proves that the director, manager or supervisor deviated
from reasonable standards of supervision or management within the
scope of their authority and that they deviated while aware that the
outcome might be a criminal violation. The main difference between
this and the other type of management or supervisory responsibility
discussed previously lies in the domain of mens rea. The proposed
offense of reckless supervision would not require the extreme crimi-
nal intent (e.g., actual knowledge) which is a component of the
other offense.
The impact of offenses of reckless management or supervision
would be reinforced by transferring the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the director, manager or supervisor. Thus, a rebut-
table presumption would exist that with respect to offenses carried
out within the corporate entity, there was a deviation from reason-
able methods of supervision or management.
Several commentators have recommended expanding even fur-
ther the responsibility of managers and supervisors by enacting an
additional provision which would specifically address negligent
management or supervision of the corporate body. 169 According to
this approach, the director, manager or supervisor would be liable
for negligence if they could objectively have foreseen the violation
of law that took place within the scope of their authority. This ap-
proach has found some support in those decisions of the United
States Supreme Court that analyze managerial and supervisory re-
168 See the Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(c) (1978),
which makes it a misdemeanor for a "person responsible for supervising particular activ-
ities on behalf of an organization" to contribute to the commission of an offense by
"reckless failure to supervise adequately those activities." Cf NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 101, § 403(4).
169 Davids, supra note 108, at 530-31; Note, supra note 107, at 303-04.
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sponsibility for corporate violation of strict liability offenses.1 70
Some jurists claim that these decisions can be interpreted as broad-
ening the prerequisites for imposing liability on the manager or su-
pervisor by requiring proof of some basic elements of "guilt," i.e.,
"a departure from a standard of care."' 71
Such a broad statutory provision imposing liability for negli-
gent management or supervision, however, raises difficulties. The
absence of due diligence on the part of the directors, managers or
other supervisors may indicate that they have not developed an effi-
cient method for the prevention of offenses, or it may indicate the
negligent operation of an existing efficient system. 172 The first al-
ternative presented raises questions as to which method can be con-
sidered effective and how much effort must be invested in
establishing and operating it, including the weight that should be
given to economic considerations. The other alternative, concern-
ing negligent operation of an existing efficient control system, en-
tails undesirable effects on the supervision and management of
corporations. Consequently, directors, managers and other super-
visors who are fearful of indictment might become overly cautious
and inhibited, thus hindering their own efficiency and the initiatives
of their subordinates. Yet, effective operation in the economic sys-
tem requires great flexibility and room for maneuvering.' 73 Such
considerations have led many jurists to the conclusion that statutory
criminal intervention in negligent behavior of directors, managers
and other supervisors should be abandoned, 74 and that criminal
law should be preserved in imposing liability for reckless manage-
ment or supervision alone.
B. SUPPLEMENTARY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Many legal systems apply supplementary and preventive meas-
ures. The value of these measures is increased due to their flexibil-
ity. Traditionally, penalties are administered against a convicted
170 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277 (1943). See also United States v. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
171 Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A Comment on
Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463, 469 (1982). But see Brickey, supra note
160, at 1346-57.
172 See Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153, 188 (Per Viscount
Dilhorne); Nattrass v. Timpson Shops Ltd., 1973 Crim. L. Rev. 197; Howells, A Blow
Against Enterprise Liability, 34 MOD. L. REV. 676 (1971).
173 Note, supra note 43, at 1270-72.
174 Panel Discussion, Economic Crimes-The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, 27 Bus.
LAw. 177, 188 (1971); Fisse, supra note 55, at 261-62; Kadish, supra note 130; Muir, supra
note 32; Note, supra note 43, at 1270-72.
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party after trial. Supplementary and preventive measures, however,
also can be exercised against entities who have not been convicted.
Such measures can be taken, therefore, according to the suggested
approach, not only against the perpetrators but, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, even against corporate entities.
1. Measures Against Directors, Managers and Supervisors
a. Disqualification
Courts should be empowered to prohibit convicted managerial
or supervisory personnel of a corporation from continuing to act in
such capacities. This measure is central to the suggested approach
which views the corporation as a tool, because it is necessary to re-
strain unreliable and dangerous persons from manipulating such
powerful instruments. This sanction would be in addition to other
penalties to which the functionaries may be subject. The court
should have broad discretion in setting the duration of the disquali-
fication and its scope.
1 75
Disqualification is a measure with personal penal overtones, yet
its general preventive aspects are also apparent. Courts should use
this measure where there are reasons to fear recurrent abuses of
power and authority to the detriment of the public. The laws of
many countries authorize the disqualification of a convicted criminal
from particular professions, usually referring to abuse of position or
severe breach of duties as the appropriate circumstances under
which this measure should be applied. 176 Some of these provisions,
as that of the English Companies Act, are directed explicitly to the
managerial and supervisory personnel of corporations.
17 7
Disqualification is more effective against the highest echelons of
corporate management and supervision than it is when employed
against lower ranking officials, because the latter usually enjoy
greater flexibility in finding alternative employment. Naturally,
courts most frequently would exercise this measure against direc-
175 The court must decide whether the official should be disqualified from serving in a
certain capacity only in the corporation in which the offense was perpetrated or in a
certain category of corporate entities, or perhaps in all corporations.
176 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES No. 4, THE GERMAN PE-
NAL CODE § 424 (G. Mueller & T. Buergenthal trans. 1961); THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES No. 23, THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE §§ 31, 35 (1978); THE AMERI-
CAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES No. 3, THE NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE § 29 (H.
Schjoldager & F. Backer trans. 1961); THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES
No. 20, THE ROMANIAN PENAL CODE art. 115 (1971).
177 THE COMPANIES ACT, 1985, §§ 295-302. See also NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED-




tors and managers of larger corporations. The unique structure of
corporate bodies often makes the measure of disqualification vul-
nerable to circumventing tactics, especially in small closely-held cor-
porations. Even if the defendant were forbidden from managing a
small corporation, he would be able to do so indirectly through his
family or other figurehead directors or managers. It is illogical to
extend the prohibition to include management or supervision
through others because it would be impossible to enforce such a
prohibition.
2. Measures Against the Corporation
The impersonal character of some supplementary measures
makes them available for use against parties not indicted in the of-
fense. By implementing such measures, the criminal law does not
limit itself to dealing with the offense and the offender directly. Af-
ter punishing the perpetrator, it concentrates, where necessary, on
eliminating the results of the delinquent activity and reforming the
system and framework which bred the offense.
a. Forfeiture
Forfeiture of profits is another supplementary measure whose
adoption is essential to the suggested approach.1 78 The rationale
for depriving the corporate body of the fruits of its offense is clear.
This goal can be achieved through forfeiture of profits accumulated
by illegal means without resort to a conviction, which one jurist de-
scribed as "a rough instrument for this purpose."' 179
Forfeiture represents a convergence of the objectives of the
criminal and tort laws, and is justified by the principle of restoration.
From the perspective of criminal law, forfeiting the fruits of the of-
fense annuls the results of the criminal activity and restores the orig-
inal situation. Such a measure is necessary because leaving those
fruits in the hands of the offender or another harms the public inter-
est and our sense of justice and often creates a dangerous situation
(e.g., leaving a weapon or drugs in the hands of a criminal).
Many penal codes allow for the forfeiture of illegal profits as a
supplementary measure to punishment, 180 and most apply the rem-
edy of forfeiture even to the fruits of crime held by a third party
178 See generally McAdams, supra note 112, at 997-98; Note, supra note 107, at 298-300.
179 Andrews, supra note 119, at 94.
180 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES No. 16, THE GREENLAND
CRIMINAL CODE § 113 (Center for Studies in CriminalJustice, U. of Chicago Law School,
1970); THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES No. 3, THE NORWEGIAN PENAL
CODE § 36 (H. Schjoldager & F. Backer trans. 1961); THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN
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beneficiary.18 1 American federal legislation lacks a general provision
concerning forfeiture, even though specific federal laws authorize
forfeiture of real property or tangible or intangible personal prop-
erty constituting or deriving from a prescribed illegal activity and
the forfeiture of any interests acquired or maintained in violation of
these laws.18 2 Moreover, one of these laws provides for the forfeit-
ing of "any. . . interest. . . security. . . claim. . . or property or
contractual right" that the accused person might have in any enter-
prise that he has "established, operated, controlled or conducted"
in a pattern of racketeering activity.' 83 Another federal law, con-
cerned with drug abuse, allows for the forfeiture of "property that is
• . .transferred to a person other than the defendant."'
18 4
Depriving the corporate body of its illegal profits, as a supple-
mentary measure to punishing the convicted perpetrator, is in es-
sence a forfeiture of a third party, the corporation. It should be
emphasized, however, that the forfeiture of illegal profits of a corpo-
ration is much more justifiable than the forfeiture of an innocent
party due to its instrumentality in the offense committed by the per-
petrator' 8 5 or from a third party who purchased the property after
the commission of the offense. 186 Where unlawful profits of the cor-
poration are usurped, the protected rights of the corporate entity
are not affected, because property acquired in a legal manner will
remain untouched. The forfeiture cannot be considered, therefore,
PENAL CODES No. 17, THE SWEDISH PENAL CODE ch. 36 (T. Sellin &J. Getz trans. 1972);
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF JAPAN art. 19 (T. Blakemore trans. 1950).
Other codes generally allow confiscation of the "fruits of the crime" or "thing[s]
produced or acquired by criminal conduct." See, e.g., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES No. 1, THE FRENCH PENAL CODE art. 11 (J. Moreau & G. Mueller trans.
1960); THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES No. 2, THE KOREAN CRIMINAL
CODE art. 48. (P. Ryu trans. 1960); THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES No.
20, THE ROMANIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 118 (1971).
181 See, e.g., THE CRIMINAL CODE OFJAPAN art. 19(2) (T. Blakemore trans. 1950); THE
NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE § 36; THE SWEDISH PENAL CODE ch. 36, § 4.
182 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1985).
183 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
184 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1985).
185 American courts have recognized for a long time the possibility of forfeiting goods
entrusted by an innocent owner to a third party who uses them in violation of drug
control statutes. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); United States v. One 1975 Mercedes
280s, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978); Commonwealth v. Two Ford Trucks, 185 Pa. Super
292, 137 A.2d 847 (1958); People v. One 1951 Ford Sedan, 122 Cal. App. 2d 680, 265
P.2d 176 (1954). See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Frame-
work for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976).
186 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) and (n) (West Supp. 1985).
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an unfair harm to innocent shareholders. 187
In using forfeiture as an instrument to abrogate illegal profits,
care should be taken not to affect the rights of the parties from
whom the profits or goods were illegally acquired. The power of the
court to issue an order of forfeiture ought to be constrained in cir-
cumstances where the original owner requests return of what has
been appropriated from him, or its equivalent. Therefore, the
prosecution usually would request the forfeiture of illegal profits,
and especially those of a corporation, when the harm done by the
illegal activity is spread among a large number of people. In such
circumstances, the actual damage to each individual seems to be
small, and hence, they are not likely to sue the corporation.
A practical problem with respect to the forfeiture of illegal prof-
its is assessing their size. In some cases approximation of those
profits raises merely technical difficulties requiring the consolida-
tion of various factors. Other situations are more complicated and
involve approximation, as for instance, the determination of the
profit resulting from the sale of a product falsely claimed to contain
a particular ingredient. The tendency should be towards simplifying
the methods of evaluation. There ought to be a compromise be-
tween the contention that all profits or even receipts from sale of the
product are illegal because consumers would not have bought the
product had they known its true content, and the assertion that il-
legal profits consist of the difference in cost between the ingredient
falsely claimed to be included in the product and the amount of that
ingredient actually included therein. 18
Forfeiture proceedings against a corporation for illegal profits
may be held separately from the trial of the individual accused. An-
other possibility is to combine the forfeiture proceedings with the
proceedings against the accused agent.18 9 If the latter alternative is
implemented, special legislation would have to be enacted to regu-
late such trials, and the corporation, which might be affected by the
deliberation, should be allowed appropriate representation.
b. Dissolution
An order to commence dissolution proceedings is the most ex-
treme preventive measure available.' 9° Its use must be reserved
187 See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
188 But see Note, supra note 107, at 298-99.
189 Cf 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (West Supp. 1985). See also supra note 107, at 299.
190 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.04, 2(a)-(b) (1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.04 comment
at 202-04 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAws, supra note 40, at 193; see also L. LEIGH, supra note 5, at 157-58.
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only for extreme situations in which the most severe kind of criminal
action has been exposed and it is established that the offense com-
mitted is a symptom of a severe disease which has spread through-
out the corporate body that has been corrupted beyond correction.
Once such a decision has been made, civil dissolution proceedings
can be instituted.
Small corporations occasionally could be dissolved. The injury
to those who depend economically on a closely-held corporate en-
tity would not be greater than the injury caused when a regular of-
fender is incarcerated and his business collapses. The position is
different, however, when a large corporation is involved. In such a
case the burden will fall not only on the shareholders, but also on
the many employees whose source of income will be eliminated. In
some instances, consumers too may be injured by the dissolution.
Moreover, dissolving a large corporation may cause a chain reaction
leading to the collapse of other financially related institutions. The
dissolution of a large corporation, therefore, should be undertaken
even more carefully.
In view of the numerous manners of circumventing a dissolu-
tion order, its effectiveness as a preventive measure seems question-
able. It is theoretically possible for the dissolved corporation to be
resurrected because it is difficult to prevent shareholders from rein-
corporating and even adopting the name of the dissolved corpora-
tion and engaging again in the same line of business. This loophole
does not necessitate an a priori abandonment of dissolution as a pre-
ventive measure. Instead, it would necessitate improvement of pre-
cautionary and supervisory methods, such as disqualifying share-
holders of the dissolved corporation from reincorporating. Concur-
rently, the legislature could enact measures to expose persons hid-
ing behind the corporate veil and to reveal the interconnection
among different corporate entities.
c. Restriction of Activity
A court order prohibiting corporate activity in the sphere in
which the offense was committed is another preventive measure,
although more moderate in impact than the dissolution of the cor-
poration. An injunction of this kind would not affect the existence
of the corporate entity. Nevertheless, a prohibitive injunction that
would limit or stop the corporation's activity in a certain field is a
drastic measure that should be used rarely, especially if it might ad-
versely affect the corporation's operation.
While deliberating whether to resort to this measure, the court
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should address two basic issues. First, it should examine the
chances of altering the basic conditions that spawned the criminal
activity. Second, the court should assess the public interest in the
matter. Where severe damage to the public interest is unavoidable
and the danger of recurrence cannot be eliminated by less drastic
measures, a restriction on corporate activity in the area within which
the offense was committed is in order.
V. THE EXCEPTIONAL CATEGORY-STRICT LIABILITY
An exception to the suggested approach, which generally disap-
proves of penalizing corporate bodies as a means of contesting
criminal activity in their framework, occurs where criminal provi-
sions of an administrative character are concerned. Substantive
criminal law regulates the modes of behavior shaped to protect the
basic social values. Without these laws, society's ability to function
would be jeopardized. On the other hand, administrative offenses
are strict liability violations characterized by eliminating the element
of mens rea as a prerequisite to the formation of criminal liability. 191
These provisions regulate the convenience and welfare of society by
forming a system dictated mostly by the process of modernization to
govern technical patterns of behavior.192 Examples include traffic
violations, sanitation regulations and safety ordinances.
The unique nature of strict liability violations markedly affects
the subject under discussion. Some of the arguments against im-
posing corporate criminal liability are less convincing when strict li-
ability offenses are involved. For example, the contention that an
indicted corporation is at a disadvantage due to the unavailability of
the complete range of defenses open to its human counterpart
weakens its impact because some defenses are inapplicable to strict
liability violations. Similarly, the argument that emphasizes that
fines are the only penalty available against the corporation, although
the severity of the offense committed normally would dictate a heav-
ier punishment, becomes irrelevant. The reason is that in most
cases, a fine is the only sanction applied by the courts for infringe-
ments of administrative penal violations.
191 See generally C. HOWARD, STRICT RESPONSIBILITY (1963); Brett, Strict Responsibility:
Possible Solutions, 37 MOD. L. REV. 417 (1974); Jackson, Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Of-
fences, in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 262 (Radzinowicz & Turner eds.
1945); Note, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
192 See generally LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDIES ON STRICT LIABILITY 193
(1974); P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 26-42 (1965); Fitzgerald, Real Crimes
and Quasi Crimes, 10 NAT. L. F. 21 (1965); Note, The Distinction Between 'Mala Prohibita'
and 'Mala in Se' in Criminal Law, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1930).
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Moreover, strict liability greatly differs in character and sub-
stance from the liability imposed by substantive criminal law. The
relatively moderate fine that usually follows the violation of the
strict liability provisions often is designed only to act as a reminder
to the offender that he has veered from the correct path and that he
should take greater care in the future. Therefore, jurists have re-
ferred to strict liability offenses by various epithets such as: "quasi
crimes," 1 93 "civil offenses," 1 94 "administrative misdemeanors,"' 9 5
"public torts,"1 96 or "pseudo-criminal offenses."' 9 7 Professor Hall
expresses the view of many that "it is clear that whatever sort of
liability strict liability may be, it is not criminal liability."'198
Thus, the tendency of some legal systems to detach strict liabil-
ity violations from substantive criminal law becomes clearer. Penal
codes proposed in the United States explicitly distinguish between
criminal offenses in the traditional sense and those breaches of the
law that lack any element of fault, defining the latter as "viola-
tions" 199 or "infractions. ' 200 A more extreme suggestion separates
strict liability violations from criminal law and establishes an auton-
omous branch of "corrective law" in which those violations would
be compiled. 201 For example, in Germany, there is a separate cate-
gory of regulatory ordinance infraction termed "Ordnung-
swidrigkeiten," 20 2  and the French Criminal Code views
"contraventions" as a subject of administrative regulations.203
Strict liability violations are located on the border between
criminal and public law. Therefore, the issue of corporate criminal
liability in this context is less objectionable than in the context of
the substantive criminal offenses. 204 Apparently, this is the reason
many European countries which uphold the Latin proposition
societas delinquere non potest (corporations do not commit crimes) have
193 Fiorella v. Birmingham, 35 Ala. App. 384, 387, 48 So.2d 761, 764 (1950).
194 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 143, at 207.
195 Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HAIv. L. REV. 615, 636 (1942).
196 Note, Public Torts, 35 HARV. L. REV. 462 (1922).
197 Ginossar, Autonomy of Corrective Law: A Projection of the Doctrine of Constructive Negli-
gence, 9 ISR. L. REV. 24, 37 n.37 (1974).
198 j. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 326 (2d ed. 1960).
199 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.04(5), 2.05(2)(a) (1962).
200 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 101, at § 302(2).
201 H. SILVING, CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF CRIME 198-99 (1967); Ginossar, supra note
197, at 24.
202 See E. G6HLER & H. BUDDENDIRK, GESETZ OBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (OWiG)
(1968).
203 H. SILVING, supra note 201.
204 Canfield, supra note 5; Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents,
60 HARV. L. REV. 283 (1946).
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created exceptions to this principle, mostly in the area of criminal
administrative legislation and in the periphery of substantive crimi-
nal legislation. Among the exceptions are violations of fiscal law,
price gouging and trade regulations. 20
5
Therefore, an allowance made with respect to corporate crimi-
nal liability in the area of strict liability violations does not invalidate
the thesis that corporate bodies are inappropriate objects of sub-
stantive criminal liability.20 6 Perhaps the exception proves the rule.
Conceding this exception implies that only violations of this particu-
lar nature, which are so different from substantive offenses, demon-
strate the basic principle that only individuals can be liable in
criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to re-examine the Anglo-
American approach that routinely imposes, with almost no limita-
tions, criminal liability on corporations. This approach has resulted
in the extension of the boundaries of the penal law-the substance,
structure, goals and means of which were traditionally formulated to
regulate the behavior of individuals only. This extension has led to
several theoretical problems, including: the potential harm to the
ideological basis of criminal law; the deviation from the recognized
framework of relationships which might serve as a basis for widen-
ing criminal liability; and the possible damage to other basic princi-
ples of the criminal system. Other difficulties are practical and
result from defects and inefficiencies ensuing from the punishment
of corporate bodies.
The presented approach emphasizes that the corporation is
merely an economic and social enterprise, namely a tool for perpe-
trating offenses. The possible manipulation of the corporate body
by human offenders does not transform it, however, into a criminal.
Criminal law, therefore, should concentrate on the responsibility of
the individuals operating the corporate entity and should determine
that only an individual who commits or is involved in an offense can
be considered an offender.
The human characteristics sometimes attributed to the corpo-
rate entity should apply only in the civil law. The determination that
a corporation manufactured a product, sold a commodity, signed a
205 See P. BOUZAT ET J. PINATEL, TRAITt DE DRorr PNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 232
(1963) (France); A. SCH6NKE STRAFGESETZBUCH (Kommentar) 356 (16. Auf., 1972);
STRAFGESETZBUCH 16 (E. Dreher 37. Aufl. 1977) (Germany); J. ANDENAES, supra note
152, at 246 (Norway); V. MANZINI, supra note 155, at 546 (Italy).
206 Andrews, supra note 119, at 94.
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contract, or even committed a tort, does not necessarily mean that it
has the capacity to be held guilty for infractions that occurred as a
result of those actions. This distinction between the respective
branches of substantive criminal law and the civil law is the direct
outcome of the goals that differentiate the criminal system from
others. In civil law, direct dictation to the human consciousness is
not the cornerstone upon which the entire corpus of regulations is
built, therefore, personification of the corporate entity seems less
artificial within its framework. Furthermore, the corporate entity is
a creation of economic activity and therefore is subject to the rules
of civil law. In order to enable a party to do business with a corpo-
ration and sue it where necessary, the corporation must be personi-
fied so that it can become a party to a contract or a tortfeasor.
Criminal activity carried out within the corporate framework
presents unique challenges to criminal law. Corporate bodies are
powerful tools and their manipulation for criminal purposes can
cause great harm to the public. Moreover, the structure of the cor-
poration and its modes of operation often provide convenient
screens for perpetrators, thereby obstructing the process of their
detection. Thus, enforcement authorities need to increase precau-
tionary and investigative measures. Furthermore, legislation is
needed to improve the quality of supervision within the corporate
framework by imposing additional legal duties on officers in super-
visory and management positions. The cumulative effect of these
efforts would be to convince all actors inside the corporate frame-
work that the penal system focuses on the individual perpetrator.
The preventive and supplementary measures of the penal law
also should be applied to the corporation in appropriate circum-
stances. Resorting to these measures is not a deviation from the
principles outlined in this Article because they can be employed
without first requiring the legal body to stand trial and assume crim-
inal liability. Of those measures, forfeiture should be most used.
More severe decrees, such as restraining orders or orders of dissolu-
tion, should be resorted to only in the most extreme cases.
Strict liability offenses are an exception to this general solution.
Infringement of such provisions should result in imposition of liabil-
ity on the corporation and on the person who committed the viola-
tion. In any event, this possible exception does not affect the basis
of the rule. On the contrary, the exception reinforces the rule by
emphasizing that a deviation from the basic principle that criminal
liability may be imposed solely upon individuals should occur only




The suggested approach is not a panacea for all problems. The
accumulated information and experience may be insufficient for a
comprehensive investigation of all aspects of the issue. Also, it may
be impossible to reach a completely satisfactory resolution to this
difficult dilemma. Nevertheless, the proposed solution has advan-
tages over those theories that view the corporation as a proper de-
fendant to almost all criminal indictments. It confines the doubts
and the subjects of controversy to a discussion whose contentions,
limitations and problems are familiar to the criminal system as a
whole.
The practical problems of this approach of identifying the per-
petrator of a crime within a complex corporate structure, or deter-
mining the actual amount of illegal profit derived from the offense
in question, or trying to prevent the corporation from compensating
the convicted agent might be no easier to resolve than the practical
problems inherent in imposing corporate criminal liability. But the
difference is in the ramifications to the entire system. The current
approach requires overstepping the boundaries of criminal law and
deviating from its principles and basic structure, while the suggested
alternative reflects a complete and consistent application of criminal
law.
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